Another brillant work of Scholorship by Kolko. His material on N. Vietnam motivation is particulary interesting

In "Anatomy of a War" author Gabriel Kolko has done an impeccable job of revealing the truth behind America's involvement in Indochina. Kolko lucidly illustrates how by 1948 the US has recognized that the Viet Minh, the anti-French resistance led by Ho Chi Minh, was not only the national movement of Vietnam, but that the Viet Minh favored independent development and ignored the interests of foreign investors and was therefor deemed "the enemy" by US policy planners.

Kolko adroitly elucidates how the US blocked all attempts at political settlement of the conflict, installed a Latin American-style terror state in South Vietnam, and blocked free, democratic elections in Vietnam because it was obvious the Viet Minh was going to win. "Anatomy of a War" illustrates how American war planners escalated the attack against South Vietnam from massive state terror to outright aggression and expanded the war to all of Indochina. A compelling and chilling account of one America's more depraved acts this century.

Kolko writes from the point of view of the Vietnamese, the real victims and the real heroes of the Indochina anticolonial wars. This is a perspective unavailable in any other volume. It is an excellent antidote for the rampant revisionism now afoot regarding this disgraceful episode in our history.

This author shows lack of knowledge about the North Vietnamese and Vc troops who fought at Hue. This lack of knowledge means that the readers have no clue of why the battle Hue lasted for several weeks.

According to two recently publish Communist books: "Hue, Spring 1968, Ban Nghien Cuu Dang[the Communist Party Research committee], Hue, 1988" and the "Tck-tkn [General offensive-General Uprising 1968, Ban Nghien Cuu Dang[the Communist Party Research committee], Ho Chi Minh City, 1988". The Nva/Vc troops in Hue consist of 4 full strength regiments: the E1, E5, E8, E9 and several battalions from the E6 regiment several sapper battalions (E is the NVA denote for regiment). Only the South Viets Hac Bao Company, most of who during the New Year was on leave, defended Hue. The Nva attacked on the first day of the Lunar New Year and quickly gain control of the city. After which they release 2,300 violent criminals from the city prison and armed them and the city VC sympathizers to form the "Nghia Quan"[Rightous Army]. In total the Nva/VC have around 9,000 to 10,000 troops in the city including the "Nghia Quan' criminals. On the second day of the New Year, the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade consists of the 2nd and 6th battalions fought their way into Hue by way of An Hoa. They succeeded in getting into the city and later the ARVN 9th Airborne battalions; fresh from their victory at Quang tri also joined them. It's true that the S. Viets ask the Americans for help after the second week of battle but it was not due to S. Viets troops cowardice, it was due to lack of men power(which the author did not clarify).

The ARVN who fought at Hue consists of the Airborne, then later the Marines, Rangers and the 1st Division, the best fighting force in Vietnam war. However, initially, the S. Viets leaders do not want the ncient city of Hue to be destroyed and forces the S. Viets and Americans to fight with little or no air and artillery support. This means the cost in retaking the city from 8,000 well-fortified enemies has to be done hand to hand. During the week of the battle, the S. Vietnamese 2nd and 7th battalions went from 500 men each down to only 200 men. The S. Viets 9th airborne battalion went from 400 men to only 100 men, the rest were killed and wounded. The S. Viets marines and ranger battalions that later came to join in the fight was fresh from the battles in Saigon without replacement and were all at or around half strengths. A typical S. Viet airborne battalion consists of 500 men, 800 men for the Vietnamese marine battalion and 450 men for the Vietnamese ranger battalion. The Nva/VC also lost a tremendous number of men and o both sides settle down to defensive and probing attacks. This also is true for the USMC since the US marines for the first two weeks or so, fought only during the day and then retreat to the MACV compound at night, this go on until sufficient troops and allies replacement have arrive. The battle for Hue was bloody and vicious, the S. Viet dead was twice that of the U.S marines, as for the Nva/VC most of their troops die during the battle for the city.

An excellent book. Perhaps the only improvement would be the addition of more detailed maps so that the reader is able to follow the events as they arise. As a Marine veteran, I seldom read anything concerning the Vietnam war because most of the books are not very factual. However, this book is well written and reveals a great deal of research. There is NO fiction here. Nolan once again demonstrates his outstanding literary talents. I agree, I dont understand how Hollywood has let this slip away.

The latest read I've experienced from Keith Nolan, Tet 1968 gave me an understanding I never got from text books or movies. I felt that I was there, and understood how the grunts felt. I have read most of Nolan's other works and find this to be a deserving addition. My next is Into Laos/Lam Son 719, which I was finally able to track down after four years. I expect more of the same realism, unwavering accuracy, and action filled narrative that I did in Tet 1968.

John Prados, a veteran writer of military history, has attempted to write the first detailed scholarly examination of the role of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Vietnam War. The Trail, dubbed the "Blood Road," was a vital pathway through the jungles of Laos and Cambodia that enabled the North Vietnamese regime to conduct a protracted guerrilla struggle in South Vietnam. Without the Trail, the indigenous Viet Cong in South Vietnam would have been virtually on their own. Nor is Prados content just to examine the history of the Trail; rather, he poses the critical question: could the United States have severed the Trail and thereby achieved a military victory in Vietnam?

There is no doubt that The Blood Trail has historical value. Prados has pulled together high and low-level accounts from both sides to produce the first real synthesis on this subject. Unfortunately, far more is promised than is delivered by this book. One major problem is the over-focus on Washington strategy sessions by Bundy, McNamara, LBJ, et al. It seems that every book written on the Vietnam War has to detour into the Oval Office, no matter how much this ground has been trampled before. The only germane aspect of these familiar policy debates is the issue of whether the insurgency in Vietnam would be handled with diplomatic or military means. Prados shows that severing the Trail by a variety of military means was the preferred option.

Although the Americans tried everything from ground attacks, bombing, mining and raiding, they could not sever the Trail. Thus Prados concludes that, "the truth is that the war fighters lost their gambit". Well, that's rather obvious Dr. Prados, given that we lost the war. Unfortunately, by asserting that we couldn't sever the Trail by military means (which actually is not proven, only that the means employed did not work), the author leaves the reader high and dry. What then should the United States have done about the Trail? Abandon South Vietnam in 1964? Negotiate surrender? How could we have known that interdicting the Trail would fail if we did not try it? There is nothing worthy of being called a conclusion here. I also believe that Dr. Prados overstates the effect of severing the Trail in any case. Even if the US military had successfully interdicted the Trail for say 6-12 months, thereby disrupting the enemy build-up, Hanoi would merely have asked for a temporary cease-fire. They could then use the period of cease-fire to repair any damage to the Trail.

I think Prados misses the boat on this one. The Vietnam War was not an exercise in military logistics, whereby if we had severed the enemy lines of communication their war effort would have collapsed. Prados has been influenced too heavily by Jomini and Clausewitz, instead of Mao. First, the enemy would always find a way to get some troops and supplies into South Vietnam, no matter how painful we made this to them. Even if we stopped 80-90% of the troops and supplies - a real success - the remaining 10-20% would probably be enough to keep a low-level insurgency burning in South Vietnam. The war was not about logistics, it was about motivation and protracted struggle. The fact is that as long as Hanoi's leaders remained committed to victory, they could outlast any temporary US military successes. The United States never intended to adopt a large-scale, open-ended defense of South Vietnam for decades on end. Thus, the Trail was probably not as critical to victory or defeat as Prados makes out.

As a participant in the air activity over the trail in 67&68,I was hopeing for more information regarding the ground activites during this period. In actuallity, there is little information about either. Onr glareing error is the authors continuing referance to all FAC aircraft as Ravens. The Ravens came into being in 1967 and were working days, flying from within Laos itself. In most cases when the author is calling the FACs Ravens, they were actually Nail or Covey FACs, flying from Thailand. Still waiting for a book that covers the construction crews, maintainers, truck drivers and GUNNERS that were a brave and awesome group.

This is a must-read for all Vietnam veterans and students of the Vietnam War. Author Prados outlines why we were never able to interdict the flow of troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos into South Vietnam. As a veteran of C-130 flare missions searching for trucks over the Trail, I now understand why our task was often so fruitless.

Sam McGowan
Vietnam Veteran, author of "The Cave", a novel of the Vietnam War.

I had some trouble getting into the first part of this novel but that probably had more to do with the fact that I started it on a train straight after finishing another book and hadn't given my brain time to adjust to the change of pace (in my head I always finish books faster than I start them).

However, once I entered the second section (the flashback to childhood), I was hooked. Wonderfully crafted this is a thriller less reliant on thrills than subtle revelations.

As the book moves towards its conclusion the subject matter gets progressively more uncomfortable and unpleasant but, conversely, to book begins to delight more and more.

The Cave can be read in one sitting (or two train journeys!) and is likely to be a novel you will want to read again and again.

Tim Krabbe's The Cave is a beautiful little book that is ultimately sad. Its tale twists over many decades and three continents and then twists back again. The beauty of the writing and the style of the author is how he is able to create so much in so little space. The reader understands the characters quickly and sympathizes with them instantly. These are basically good people moved to do things they would not otherwise do by an irrestible force in the form of a man, Axel. The themes of lost chances and the interconnectedness of everyone are present and poignant throughout the novel. The suspense is in the first part of the novel but the strength of the story is in the revealing of the tapestry that created the action. This novel was a joy, albeit bitter sweet. Worth the time it will take to finish this beautiful little tale.

I was surprised to see the book described in reviews as a thriller. Although it has some elements associated with that genre, thriller-readers will probably be disappointed with The Cave. Aside from the fact that it's a very fine piece of literature--something rarely true of thrillers--it's primarily an enchanting (and ultimately chilling) tale of love and fate. The translation was so smooth I wondered if it hadn't been written in English to begin with. It has the kind of weight that is usually only seen in the work of European masters--Peter Handke and Friedrich Durrenmatt come to mind. Speaking as a novelist, I have to say that I wish I'd written it myself.

Morley Safer traveled back to Vietnam in 1989 to see how that country has changed in the fourteen years since the end of America's involvement in the war. Did the Vietnamese people really win? Morley's goverment provided guide, Ms. Mai, is assigned to escort and provide him access to the sites he reported from during the war. Ms. Mai envies the freedom that women in America have. All throughout the country it is apparent that the Vietnamese people still live with the scars of the war. It is an inescapable reality of their existence. Now, under communism, the Vietnamese people are worse off ... and it is made very clear in this book. Morley writes that the one thing many Vietnamese citizens resent the most is that they do not have the ability to hop on a Freedom Bird to escape the harsh realities of their daily existence. This book provides a fair perspective on what the Vietnamese people think of their victory.

This is one of those books someone gives you for Christmas because you are a Vietnam veteran, and you digest it to see what it has in common with your experiences. While I was a helicopter pilot in the Delta, and nowhere near the places Morley visits in his periodic reporting forays, one gets the message of what anyone who frequented this tropical country eventually got. "The place sort of grows on you," one journalist comments to another. That's what happened to all of us; we experienced the other side of the world as young men. This was an out-of-the-culture experience that only we knew we were certainly having--despite the efforts of our media, politicians, and college protesters to define it. Another book the Vietnam vet needs on his bookshelf to help sort out the morass this bureacratic farce was paid for in our military blood.

This is a book which has affected me greatly both as a person who grew up in the Vietnam area and as a professional journalist. Safer succeeds in creating pictures of Vietnam which were never before filed. It is a crime that this book is not in print.

Too many things are shown in the wrong places on the maps.

The most hilarious example is on page 97. Laos had two capital cities: the royal capital of Luang Prabang, where the (purely ceremonial) king lived, and the administrative capital of Vientiane, where there was an actual government. On this map, Luang Prabang has been moved across the border into North Vietnam (a very strange place for the royal capital of Laos), while Vientiane has been moved across the other border into Thailand. The same map also has the town of Vinh, in North Vietnam, shifted westward from its actual location near the coast; it appears on this map to be closer to the Laotian border than to the sea.

Flip one page back to look at the map on page 95, which shows the Tonkin Gulf Incidents and the U.S. air strikes of August 5, 1964. This map has Vinh in the right place, but Hanoi has been mislocated; it is shown as being southwest of Haipong (Hanoi is actually northwest of Haiphong). More important, the map shows Hon Gai, one of the targets of the U.S. air strikes, as being right next to the Chinese border. Hon Gai is actually well to the southwest of the location shown; if it had been close to the Chinese border, Lyndon Johnson would not have approved the strike against it in this operation. The location shown for the aircraft carrier Constellation, which launched the planes for the strike against Hon Gai, is also seriously inaccurate.

A small inset map on page 95 shows the tracks of the two U.S. destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy, on the night of August 4, 1964, and the tracks of objects that appeared on their radar, believed to be torpedo boats attacking them. The track shown for the supposed torpedo boat designated V2 bears no resemblance to any track that shows in the records of the destroyers, and the track shown for V1 does not bear a close resemblance to any track that shows in the records of the destroyers.

I have not found so many errors in other maps in this atlas, but I have found more than I liked. The one thing an atlas is absolutely supposed to do is show things in the correct locations on the maps.

This is a beautifully illustrated book with battlefield plans of the Vietnam Wars and details of all the troop movements. It places the reader right at the center of the war zone. The text on the left handside details the events involved at the time while maps are drawn on the right handside.

The texts are concised, focused and give the reader a clear and broad picture of the war.

Adds a new dimension sorely lacking in other good books about Vietnam. Good historical coverage all the way back to pre-history, sharp clear graphics and comprehensive coverage. I was there in 1968-69 and think this book is a valuable addition to anyone's Vietnam collection -- or a fine place to start if you are just learning about this country and its wars. Kudos to Colonel Summers, the author, for producing such a fine atlas.

COL Michael D. Mahler served as the personnel officer (S-1) of the 1st Brigade/1st Infantry Division from August-December 1967 and Executive Officer of 3-5th Cavalry/9th Infantry Division from December 1967 to August 1968. The weirdest thing about this memoir is that Mahler never identifies his own unit or any other, or any individuals; everything and everyone is referred to in generic terms. It is very odd to read an account where no names are mentioned. With all this secrecy, I'm surprised that Mahler didn't conceal that this was a Vietnam memoir and instead call it "Orangeland". Essentially, this is a collection of anecdotes, war stories and observations strung together. Some are interesting, some are not. This work is lacking in humanity, since there are no characters (just generic, faceless, company commanders, platoon leaders, etc.) and there are no great lessons here. It is also odd for a non-green tabber (i.e. a unit commander) to be writing a memoir; the actual trigger-pullers might have done a better job. There is not even any of the drama of supporting a combat unit; Mahler could have gotten much more into the specifics of armor logistics but instead he just glosses over it. Overly generalized to a fault. One suspects Mahler is some kind of weenie by the end. Of note, the squadron intelligence officer (S-2) is never mentioned, so I guess intelligence and what the enemy was up to was not a big concern for Mahler. The maps are few and crude. The only slight value of this book is the paucity of other armored unit memoirs from Vietnam. This book is far inferior to Sergeant Ralph Zumbro's Tank Sergeant.

The previous reviewer missed the point. As an Executive Officer Mike Mahler was second in command, and often on-site commander of the unit. In this position he also had a lot of day-to-day contact with supporting and supported units. This is not a blood and guts account of fighting tanks, but one of how Armored Cavalry works. As a former Armored Cav Officer it was a great read and Colonel Mahler did a great job of explaining the complexities and challenge of Cavalry Operations. I wish I had had officers as good as he was commanding me.

As to not ID'ing the unit, that is his choice and I will not fault him for it. Maybe he just did not want to drag up the names of dead or incompetent officers. Who knows.

If I could I would love to talk with the Colonel one on one about his experiences. Great book for anyone interested in Armored Cavalry.

Major Mahler served in an Armored cavalry unit in Vietnam before and during the Tet Offensive, and here he relates his experiences during that time.

One may not associate armor with Vietnam, but armor did play a significant role in the war, as Major Mahler demonstrates here.

The stories within run the gamut, from the Birddog pilot shot down to the discovery of VC grains hidden along a road that the troopers confiscate, only to find that a nearby village gets pillaged by the VC because the grain was hidden along the road for the VC to take; the troopers gather enough grain to give back to the stricken villagers. There is also the tunnel that an APC falls into - and promptly unearths a surprised NVA general. There are the running shootouts during the Tet Offensive, and children accidently hit by .50 caliber machine gun fire and operated on by Army medics. There is the night an enemy company literally walks into an ambush by armor and a delightfully one-sided battle with an NVA batallion holed up in a large village, a battle that somewhat resembles the climax of Invasion USA.

There is also Major Mahler's note on the situation on the ground following Tet - of how farmers who could not use roads the year before could now take their crops to market, "and this was progress that could be seen and felt in a war where progress could not easily be quantified."

Major Mahler takes us to Vietnam through his words and we see what went on.

I lived in Madison at the time of the legal procedings of the three captured bombers. Rads is the most comprehensive account of the bombing that I have personally read. However, I agree with a previous review that Bates mistakingly attributes Armstrong's actions to his family history. I believe that Armstrong was motivated personally from his experiences in Chicago during the 1968 convention, and seeing the escallation of the war. I went to the Madison Public Library and read the newspaper files on Armstrong and the others, and there were important events especially after Armstrong's return to Madison that were ommited. I believe that the single most important lesson from this book or from other events of that era i.e. Kent State, is that it was local people, hometown people that were involved in the anti-war movement. These people included both yound and old. They were not communist-sympathizers or professionals from out of town. Young men from Karl and Dwight Armstrong's east-side Madison neighborhood were much more likely to fight and die in Vietnam than men from David Fine's or Leo Burt's background. True, Fine did not light the fuse, but he got off much eaiser than the Armstrongs

I read this about five years ago after finding it as a remainder in a supermarket.

What I recollect most about it was the uncanny detail the author came up with. In fact, it reminded me somewhat of at least one of Halberstram's books in that such detail MUST have been contrived. So, while well-written, there were some credibility problems.

To this day, I'm not absolutely sure where I stand on the bombing.

I would recommend it, though, as NOT romanticizing the radical left of that era. There are, of course, some from that time still living in Madison (and Berkeley, and Stanford, and...) reminiscing the period. They're kind of a radical 60s equivalent of the VFW and are just too naive to realize in how much of an Ivory Tower they reside . But there were down sides, not the least of which is graduate students whose entire careers were altered, finished because of this bombing.

Tom Bates presents the bombing of the AMRC within an intriguing, captivating story. As a high school senior, I have not lived through the war and the anti-war movement. Nonetheless, RADS provided me with enough background information to understand the book (based around the bombing) on both the specific level and the larger scheme of things.

Bates introduces the 'romantic' appeal of political radicalism in the late 60s and early 70s logically and insightfully. In addition, throughout the book, the reader gets to know the bombers and the people with whom they interact.

The book does not include any extraneous chapters. Bates has a reason for every section of the book that he includes. Because of this, the book is never slow to read; much of the book is very suspenseful, set up by the well-chosen quotes that begin every chapter.

This book is a must-read for anyone who is interested in radicalism, historic bombings, or the anti-war movement of the 60s and 70s.

Overall I thought this was a great book. It went into great detail concerning even the most mundane details of VC/NVA life (I consider this an asset, not a liability). I enjoyed reading about how they fought, what kind of weapons they used, and the tactical and logistical details of the various VC/NVA units discussed. This book is limited in scope, after all it is called "Inside the VC and the NVA", so of course it's not going to go into detail about the ARVN fighting ability and THEIR details, nor does it address allied "atrocities". There were some drawbacks however. The VC and NVA interviews were interesting, but I think the information contained in them needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Although the authors address and dismiss the possibility of coercion, I think that's a very real possibility. Secondly, the book could have done without the input of the generals. For the most part, I thought the comments of the generals were suspect. After all, they had the kill ratio/body count agenda. All in all, a great book.

This book is a must-read for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the Vietnam war. The first review complains that this "reads like a school book. Ideal for the scholar, maybe less than ideal for the casual reader." Well, what did that "casual" reader expect from a book whose cover proclaims that it "fills a huge gap in the historiography of the Vietnam War" ??

This is NOT a dull or difficult book for anyone interested in the subject. The facts, figures, and background the authors include are very helpful in understanding what led the several armed forces to come into battlefield contact, and why they acted as they did. Particularly helpful is the authors' technique of letting participants tell their own stories -- even stories that contradict each other. The book has a helpful index, and extensive source notes and bibliography for those who wish to read further.

Perhaps the major fault of the book is that the authors detail the terror and coercive tactics of North Vietnamese forces, and the failings of North Vietnamese leadership, while omitting any mention of similar tactics and the failings of the US/South Vietnamese forces (except the inescapable acknowledgment of My Lai). By this omission, the authors leave the mistaken impression that South Vietnam had a legitimate and widely-supported democratic government with civil rights, whose secret police, ARVN, and US troops never engaged in abuse of the population and enemy prisoners. The VC/NVA actions should at least have been put in context by mention of the South Vietnamese/USA Phoenix program, corruption, tiger cages, etc. The reader may wish to also read _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth to get additional perspective on the failings of the South Vietnamese government.

The authors' limited use of their own feelings about the war, combined with a skillful combination of others' personal narratives and official reports and information, results in a very readable, informative and valuable book. Particularly moving is the Afterword, which reads in part, "We questioned each other and ourselves about whether we were 'going soft' on the VC/NVA who were dedicated to the deaths of our friends.... Yet, the more we researched and wrote, the more we learned that the majority of the VC/NVA did their duty as they saw it -- not unlike ourselves and our fellow soldiers....
"Slowly, and despite our efforts to do otherwise, we began to feel more kinship with the VC/NVA than we did with many of our fellow [civilian] Americans.... Even more sobering to us was the moment when we finally realized that we had more in common with our former enemies than with the politicians who had sent us to war."

Having studied political, religious, and social extremist groups for over 15 yrs, I found this book to be a good primer for not just information on the VC and the NVA, but I saw parallels between the methods used by the VC/NVA and other extremist groups. Be they religious extremist groups or right wing militia type groups. Obviously the parallel breaks down if you take it too far, but it was very interesting and I'd recommend it to anyone who is interested in extremist groups - especially with the asymmetrical threat environment nowadays.

This book was published before Robert S. McNamara started churning out books about Nam. There had been a lot of books about Nam up to that point, and what struck me was how much had been left out of all of them. Since this book called itself the complete story, and listed the author's home town and zip code, I wrote to the author, asking if he could send me any funny Nam bits for MY VIETNAM WAR JOKE BOOK. It was difficult for me to believe that Wilbur Morrison was smart enough to know how much of his book I hadn't read and still write to tell me that Nam had no humor, the American forces in Vietnam entirely lacked anything to joke about, and I should do more reading. Thinking `What does he know?' I then wrote to Robert S. McNamara, promising to give him full credit for any funny Nam bits he could send me, though MY VIETNAM WAR JOKE BOOK wasn't really that kind of joke book, it was more about things that a 19-year-old grunt might say that would never find its way between the covers of any book more historical than DISPATCHES by Michael Herr. I even remembered a joke that I hadn't heard in Nam: What do you call a guy with no arms and no legs when he's swimming? Bob, of course, though you might not call him Bob to his face if he were the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America. Did Bob even know what Nixon was saying when the White House Transcripts book said, "That was national security, because it had to do with the (expletive deleted) Vietnam war" ? (President to John Dean, March, 1973, when a cancer on the presidency was all the rage).

There is a point in THE ELEPHANT AND THE TIGER when I definitely thought that something was left out, possibly because those who supplied the official information thought it was necessary to sanitize it. In November, 1946, something happened in Haiphong which does not get mentioned, but by December, Morrison reports that the Viet Minh were retaliating for something by engaging in open warfare against French troops. If this book was really complete, every reader would be informed what the Vietnamese thought they were retaliating against, and would not be surprised, not even as surprised as some Americans were by the ceasefire Tet offensive in 1968, which was designed to show that if anyone in Nam didn't know what was going to happen, it was sure to be the Americans. That might not be funny in America, but by 1968, I'll bet the French were able to laugh, and they might still be laughing.

This ahrd-reading book is really THE FULL STORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR. IT's detailed and very well researched. The author had access to a lot pf previously unseen documents, due to the Freedom Of Information Act.

But a detail amazed terrifically. In page 114, Morrison makes the following statement, about JFK murder:

"Later that day, during a motorcade through the streets of Dallas, President Kennedy was assassinated by a professed communist and former United States Marine - Lee Harvey Oswald"

I almost choked with desbilief. Does Morrison, such an accomplished and veteran writer, really believes in that? Does he really believe in the Warren COmission report that Oswald acted alone??!! I could not believe this. At least he could have written "...was SUPPOSEDLY assassinated by..."

Oh boy, this is heavy reading. The book deals about everything in the Vitnam War. The funny thing is that Morrison is consiedered to be a great military AVIATION writer, but this book delaing with a much more complex subject is very entertaining, objective and complete.

Great read, albeit a hard one.