Trivial bone-picking: the author states the commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division was the only general officer killed in the Viet Nam war. However I recall the great sense of loss everyone in the Cav felt when General Casey, CG, 1st Cavalry Division(AM), was killed when his UH-1 went down. But on the whole the book rings true.

Like most historical events and first person accounts of that history, there is more than one perspective that must be considered. Mr. Tripp's book although excellent and compelling, gives the reader 'his' experience. Sometimes this effort comes at the expense of objectivity. So, in reading this book be aware of other realities that share his Vietnam world.

I was with the 9th Infantry Division approximately the same time. In fact, I know many of the same places Mr. Tripp refers to in his book. Who knows, maybe he and I shared C-rations at some point. I also know that Mr. Tripp's description of the 9th Division and the Division Snipers in particular, although written from his perspective and with literary license, and meant to be compelling, is also unfair and plays into the hands of those who called us 'baby killers' and 'killing machines'.

We were young men, 18 years old and in combat for the first time. For most of us, it was not about proving one's self, or fighting the internal war with families and other bagage. It was about getting through the day without getting killed. Mr. Tripp has provided us with some gutsy descriptions of that emotion, I only wish it was not at the expense of other GI's who shared the same battleground, we were not all automatons nor were we without our own feelings of guilt, regardless of origin.

I can't make any claims to the validity or non-validity of the book's subject matter, but I found the whole book engrossing from beginning to end. The man's private motivations and trials may not belong to everyone, but I think they are deep and true enough so that anyone can understand them. They are mixed in with commentary about the war from the author's viewpoint then as a young man and at the time of writing, and is also filled with the nerve wracking, often spooky action of that period in that place, which creates its own atmosphere along the lines of Dispatches by Herr. This book is not to be missed.

As a Special Forces cadre,I observed the Marine Recon teams working the Laotian border around our base at Lang Vei. Their 4 man teams provided much needed information for everyone. We knew of massive enemy build ups in the area prior to Tet, thanks to these brave men. There is no mention of those days in any of these books. Sadly, the story of Marine Recon's greatest feats will probably never be told.

I believe Col. Norton pretty well encapsulated the climate over there...I wasn't in Recon, but he did a great job of explaining how counter-recon tactics of the NVA evolved, beginning in Force Recon Diary 1969 and on through Force Recon Diary 1970. Both books were great...real keepers.

Force Recon Diary, 1970, picks up where FRD, '69 left off, with "Doc" Norton returning to Vietnam and his second tour with 1st Force. The detail of his work is exceptional, and brings the reader right into the "harbor site" with the team. Major Norton has the ability and talent to capture the moment and spares no expense in "telling it like it was." For anyone interested in the tough business of Marine Reconnaissance during the Vietnam War, the Force Recon Diaries, written by Doc, are as good as it gets. Get this book, sit down with a stiff drink, and read what it was like to be a member of a Marine Force Recon Team in combat. Trully, a great source of information. I give it 5 Stars!

Shooting at the Moon details the "alliance" between the American government and the Hmong (Meo) minority people of Laos during the Lao civil wars. Roger Warner writes with a very readable, journalistic style that draws the reader in. The book tracks several main "characters" throughout the war's development and escalation, explores possible motivations for American involvement, and the aftermath of the American betrayal of the Hmong. If you have read "The Ugly American," then you will see many instances of those fictional events happening for real in Shooting at the Moon.

As a university student who read this book to complement a research paper, I was disapppointed. Although very reader-friendly, Warner's style also verges on fiction and it is difficult to separate true fact from his interpretations of events. In such a book, this may be unavoidable, given that he attempts to plop the reader down into Laos of the late 1960's and 1970's. Warner does his job in that sense, but in doing so he blurs the line between fact and fiction. Moreover, I find that he often glosses over events and writes in a very American style, sometimes very dismissive of the Lao and Meo peoples. However, if you are looking for a "real life" wartime Communism vs. Capitalism cliffhanger, then Shooting at the Moon should fulfill that role quite nicely. For more thoroughly researched and more comprehensive books on Lao history, including the Lao Revolution, I would recomend Arthur J. Dommen's Laos: Keystone of Indochina and anything by Martin Stuart-Fox.

Warner accurately captures the bizarre twists and turns of the U.S. surrogate warfare efforts in Laos. My experience as a direct participant during the 1972-75 time frame gives me the advantage of being able to attest to some of Warner's chronicle. The historical record also provides us information on the failed strategies used by the American State Department in their desire to control events in Laos. Although the North Vietnamese considered all of Southeast Asia as their theater of operations, the American effort, in contrast, became one of disjointed and , at times, bumbling entities running into each other without effective command and control. This does not in any way diminish the heroic efforts of honest men trying too carry out tactical operations while complying with unreasonable controls of the American government bureaucracy. The legacy of these failed strategies can be seen with the difficult acclimation of the Hmong into American society. Warner's spares us the micro detail and intense emotionalism of other books on the same surrogate warfare. This makes "Shooting at the Moon" a good compelling read. With the above bureaucratic absurdities in mind, Warner was right on when he said that "it was the Americans who were shooting at the moon"!

The author spent years gathering the material for this book and Warner has written the definitive book on the period. Rarely has a non-participant so closely captured the feel and intensity of the times. I worked as a fighter pilot with the Raven FACs and was totally astounded at how good this book reads. A triumph.

A girl born in Vietnam has fallen in love with a buffalo herder who has seen the mayhem in the war. The girl, Loi lives on the streets. The buffalo herder Khai is whom she has fallen in love with instead of an officer. Those thoughts have been trailing the minds if Loi should leave her family to have a better life in America.

Have you ever wondered how it was for children that had American fathers but lived in Vietnam? Well this story Son of the Buffalo Boy is just about that. The main character Loi was trying to look for her "father" who now lives in America. First she was arranged to marry a person who she didn't like so she faked her death and ran away with the person she loved, Khai. However, when they were getting on the bus Khai didn't make it so Loi had to go to the new town all alone. When she got there, she had no money so she had to practical beg for food and steal money. She also meets her "brother" Joe who was an orphan. He took her to the place were she could register to go to America. He then took her to live with him in Amerisian Park. Two weeks later when she was walking down the street, she saw one of Khai's carvings and she he was there so she left a message with the storeowner. To know if she meets back up with Khai or goes to America you have to read it first.

Loi wanted to get married with Khai but her mom and uncle made her get married with Officer Hiep and she doesn't want to so she escapes to Saigon so she can go to America and find her dad, then she arrived to Saigon andand Khai came after and she found him and didn't want to go anymore so she went back home and got married with Khai in their village. I agree with the author because it was a really good bookand she put a lot of details and good events in the book. My favorite part when she was pretending to look like a bumb on her engagement day with officer Hiep.The title connects with the book. I would recomend this book to probably anybody or people that like a little romance because this bookis kind of like a romance. I think it would be a great book for anyone.

I am a Vietnam infantry veteran and served with the 101st Airborne Div during this same time period. Chambers first book, Recondo, was much more interesting and far more accurate. This effort seems to have come from an author who never felt the heat of combat, just heard the stories, I know however, that is not true in this case. His recollections bounce around so much I kept getting lost in the stories. While I was "only a leg" my company employed most all of the super sneeky tactics you macho LRRPs seem to have invented. I bought this book based on the author, my mistake.

This is the second Larry Chambers book I have read. And I have enjoyed both of them. This is not a Pulitzer Prize book but it is a good book written by one guy who describes his personal experience in Vietnam in a humorous, matter of fact way. I have learned several field craft principles from Larry Chambers books. This is a very good light reading book for those who enjoy reading about the Vietnam War.

This book stands alone on the merits of its content. It is characterized by excellent writing. I have read other books about LRRP's and Special Op's in Vietnam, and most have been characterized by poor writing and sketchy details. Not so here.
Mr. Chambers has written a truly superb book that never once lets up with the riveting suspense. It is simply one exciting tale after another, and this is one ex-soldier who knows how to vividly detail his experiences 'in-country'.

There are many missions in this book that will leave you leaning forward in anticipation. Nightime airmobile extractions under blackout conditions while NVC soldiers were taken by surprise, only yards away. Once Mr. Chambers had an NVC soldier grab him at the same moment he was extracted while holding the line, having to kick away his assailant. He paints an excellent picture of a silent life, using hand-signals and often traveling at night, avoiding any trails and utilizing complete stealth.
His recollections are not always positive,as he discovered another party who had their deception revealed and were left dead for their comrades to find. Another time while on leave in Vietnam he visits a friend at a training facility, and watches as an instructor is showing a class the proper way to handle a grenade and it explodes, causing him to lose his arm. Even using the radio while no enemy was near was hazardous, when 'miking' the transmitter on a mountaintop caused stray electricity at this high altitude to send an electrical strike to the transmitter, necessitating an Airmobile evacuation of the injured.

Mr. Chambers went on to earn a Masters Degree after his service. This was clear from the first chapter, as I found myself completely involved in this book, finding it hard to put it down. A riveting book that better describes life behind the lines than others of its genre.

I was never drawn into the story. The writing and editing could have been better. The distant narrator left me feeling uninvolved, and I never felt or cared anything for the characters. For a well-written Vietnam story that draws the reader in, read The Proud Bastards.

I read this book with eager anticipation because I had read Heinemann's Close Quarters, which I rate as a great book. I had also read that Paco's Story was a National Book Award winner. What a letdown. Even though Heinemann's considerable talent at writing text shines through, this story just didn't seem very good to me.

Heinemann's a veteran, so I hesitate to write this, but the feeling I got in reading this book was that it's like tabloid sensationalism. It seemed like the war part of the story was overblown to appeal to people looking for that kind of story and the back home part of the story was either mindnumbingly dull or voyeuristic. Not a great formula for an appealing book - and it wasn't, in my view. I'd recommend Close Quarters heartily, but I only gave this as high a rating as 3 stars because the text writing is well done - it's just wasted on this story.

Paco Sullivan arrives in the town of Boone on a bus, without two dollars to his name. He's the physically and psychically devastated sole survivor of a fire fight in Vietnam, his wounds so bad that the medic who first treated him demanded a transfer and gradually drank his own life away. The America that Paco returned to is profoundly disinterested in his wartime experiences. Young people seem not to even know about the war and older folks, like Ernest Monroe, an ex-Marine veteran of Iwo Jima, who gives Paco a job washing dishes at his Texas Lunch diner, are more interested in telling him their own war stories.

Paco is haunted by memories of Vietnam and, quite literally, by the spirits of his dead fellow soldiers--in fact, they narrate the book. As he tries to put together a "normal" life, his continual immersion in the dishwashing sink seems to represent an attempt to wash away past sins--atrocities committed during the war--and a kind of rebirth through baptism. He gradually develops a strange voyeuristic relationship with Cathy, the flirtatious niece of the owners of the Geronimo Hotel, where he's staying. But in the end, the dynamic between them turns out to be something very different than what he believes it to be and as the story ends he gets back on the bus and heads out of town.

This isn't a bad novel by any means, and it's certainly better than Toni Morrison's Beloved, which it rather notoriously beat out for the National Book Award, but I found that much of it simply didn't work for me. The unusual narrative device, of letting the dead speak, quickly loses it's charm and becomes sort of artificial and intrusive. It becomes especially distracting during passages where the spirit guide renders Paco's thoughts and feelings. The story itself is kind of an amalgam of clichés from the popular culture's rather deranged view of the war. In particular, there's one scene in which he participates in a gang rape that is purely obligatory, rather than growing organically out of the story. The author is a Vietnam veteran, so I'm hesitant to simply dismiss it as pandering, but one senses that it is there because Heinemann thinks the reader expects it to be.

The odd narrative structure, Paco's lack of any life outside of his mundane job, and the derivative nature of the war scenes, all serve to prevent us from feeling any connection with Paco. Talk of fictional personae coming to life on the page is relatively silly, but these factors continually remind us that he's merely a character. To a degree, we admire the inner drive that keeps him moving forward, but we have no idea where it comes from or why he keeps on. Ultimately, this is the only occasionally affecting story of a survivor whose survival, though admirable in itself, fails to convey any broader meaning to the reader.

GRADE : C+

I appreciate everything that Rad Miller, Jr. did for his country, but this book is a poor testament to the men of Special Forces in Vietnam. His unedited, unpolished style of writing might appeal to some, but I found Miller's style to be annoying, self-glorifying and, frankly, probably a little fanciful. Miller tries to convince us that SEALs are the ultimate warriors, yet he details his screw-ups and his colleagues screw-ups. Unprofessional behavior that would normally get you killed fills the book. I don't know about SEALs in general, but this guy wasn't a patch on the Green Berets that I know who served in Vietnam. Just goes to prove that the best of the best are the ones that you never hear about or read about.

One thing can be said about this SEAL is that he sure has a sense of humor.Of course,war isnt pretty.Its sexy.But really,unlike these other books I've read,like LRRP's Ranger,boy ,does that book ramble on and on about technical issues and stuff I've never been familiar with.But Rad was able to express himself not in a robot fashion,just brain washed to kill,but the human side of being a commando.It was very exciting and intruiging.I was totally involved in it.I have read some true combat novels that just don't get to details about what was going on.Some didnt explain how it felt in combat in true real time detail.Rad Miller takes you there.I hope to get his autograph some day.

I wanted to know what it was like to be a SEAL in Vietnam. This book more than explained what it was like. Miller tells his life story from graduating high school to buying a tape-deck that lasted nearly 20 years. He goes through what BUD/S was like, SEAL Training, and getting his fair share of beatings. Oh, by the way, I hate to read, but I didn't put this book down. I highly recommend it.

The story that Larry Berman tells of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy is a familiar and unpleasant one. Just before the 1968 election the Nixon campaign contacted President General Thieu of South Vietnam. In returning for Thieu opposing peace talks that had just started, and subsequently ruining Hubert Humphrey's election chances, Nixon and Kissinger promised him a better deal. Four years later Kissinger, while keeping Thieu largely in the dark, finally came up with an agreement in October 1972. The Americans would withdraw, American prisoners of war would be returned, the North Vietnamese army would allow to keep troops in the south, and instead of being the sole government of South Vietnam, Thieu would now have to share this with the National Liberation Front (NLF). Thieu was extremely upset about this and in order to appease his feelings the United States claimed, falsely, that the North was trying to seek major changes in the agreement. They bombed the North (the infamous "Christmas Bombings"), returned to the negotiating table, made token changes to the agreement, and falsely proclaimed "peace with honor" in January 1973.

Much of this has already been well known, and has been detailed by such writers as Gareth Porter, Seymour Hersh and most recently Jeffrey Kimball in Nixon's Vietnam War. Berman argues something new however. Nixon and Kissinger claimed that they had won a viable agreement which was undermined by Watergate. The collapse of presidential authority let a cowardly Congress ruin their farsighted policy and allow the North to win. By contrast, their many critics claim that Nixon and Kissinger had obtained nothing but a "decent interval," allowing them to extricate themselves knowing that the North would conquer them in a few years.

Berman, by contrast, argues that what Nixon and Kissinger really wanted was a peace agreement that they knew the North would violate. Once they did they could invoke American airpower aggressively and continually until the end of Nixon's term. The agreement was nothing but a sham, only a necessary stage in producing what would be a new Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I am skeptical about this argument. First off, it only really appears in the last 100 pages of the book. The statements that Berman cites from Nixon, Kissinger and Haig can be interpreted in a variety of ways. It could be self-delusion, especially on Nixon's part. It could be simple belligerence designed to buck up their south east Asian allies and their own anti-communist beliefs.

The second weakness with the argument arises from the deal itself. The United States had already conceded a Northern military presence in the South, the essential unity of the country, and some form of NLF presence in the government. Given these concessions it would be tricky to argue that the North had broken them and then get from Congress the blank cheque to attack them. Even more problematic was the fact that the United States and the South also violated the agreement. Thieu had no interest in any kind of national reconciliation, and Berman himself admits that the United States violated the agreement by transferring bases to the South. Berman also notes that neither Kissinger nor Thieu wished to free the thousands of political prisoners in the South. The key point is that if both Thieu and Nixon violated the agreement, they could not reasonably expect to mobilize Congressional support when the North did.

There are other weaknesses in Berman's book. The book is poorly annotated, which becomes increasingly irritating as one goes further into the books and where one wonders what the source of Berman's statements are. It is really appalling that publishers are allowed to show such contempt for endnotes and footnotes. Berman does have access to new documents, but there is a tendency to overquote them. This gives the book a "cut and paste" tendency. Most serious of all is Berman's treatment of the military situation and his attitude towards the Thieu regime. It is less South Vietnam, let alone Vietnam, but the Thieu regime who is viewed as betrayed. Berman's book insinuates that by withdrawing on these terms, Nixon and Kissinger doomed Thieu to inevitable conquest.

Thieu's defeat was probably inevitable, but not for the reasons that Berman suggests. He quotes the right wing critics of the deal, like Admirals Zumwalt and Moorer and Ambassador Negroponte. But he does not explain why Vietnamization failed to rebuild or reinforce the Southern Army. He does mention that the NLF rallied remarkably after the 1972 Easter Offensive (other scholars think they rallied even earlier) but he says little more about them. But as Arnold Isaacs pointed out in his invaluable Without Honor, the South Vietnamese Army always had enough arms to defend itself. Before the final offensive it had the third largest navy in the world and it had twice as many tanks as its enemies. As late as 1974 when already guerilla forces were weakening it, it outshot the enemy by a margin of 60 to 1. What the ARVN lacked of course, was an army with leaders who were honest or competent or courageous (anyone of these qualities would have worked) and an infantry who were willing to fight for their causes. For this failure Thieu was especially responsible, as were for that matter his disgruntled and belligerent countrymen.

Professor Berman's latest installment of his Vietnam War trilogy really is a tour de force. What I found particularly fascinating about the book was his research around the whole issue Vietnam Peace Talks and the 1968 election. Past books have suggested the following: A) Candidate Nixon's interference was fuzzy and therefore more rumor than fact; or B) Perhaps it was one of Nixon's surrogates speaking on their own behalf to Thieu and the South Vietnamese. However, Berman's book nails Nixon and Kissinger thoroughly to the wall.

The sad fact is the agreements hammered out in Paris in January of 1973 was roughly identical to what the Johnson Administration was offering to put on the table had peace talks broken out in October 1968. The only difference was by January 1973, the toll in Vietnam had risen to roughly 52,000 American dead. No peace, no honor, indeed.

Professor Berman has written a great book and it should be on the desks of every college student studying how presidential decision-making impacts the foreign arena.

Larry Berman is the perfect person to expose President Richard Nixon's duplicity regarding his Vietnam War policy, wherein Nixon sought to promote a peace agreement he and Henry Kissinger both knew would accomplish nothing in thwarting North Vietnam's design to achieve a unified Vietnamese Communist nation. In the typical Nixon fashion, design was preeminent over ultimate reality as he heralded the agreement ending U.S. participation in the nation's most controversial war with the glorious phrase, "Peace With Honor."

"No Peace, No Honor" is the logical sequel to Larry Berman's earlier penetrating work, "Planning a Tragedy," which was a fascinating look inside the Johnson Administration and the mindset which brought about America's entry into the Vietnam conflict. Robert McNamara, despite his earlier assurances, proved to be a naive administrator, making mistake upon mistake in forcing America into an ever deepening hawkish posture. The wise counsel of State Department operative George Ball, who provided the beneficial hindsight input of French president Charles DeGaulle, whose country fought a war in Indo China between 1946 and 1954, was unfortunately spurned.

With Johnson gone and the Nixon Administration taking over in January of 1969, the scene is set for Berman's latest work. Taking advantage of recently declassified government documents, Berman presents a chaotic scene in which Nixon and Kissinger seek to find a way out of the Vietnam morass without conveying the impression that the U.S. was running out on an ally and leaving it vulnerably exposed to a successful Communist insurgency. Despite ferocious bombing, Nixon was ultimately confronted with a situation wherein public support for the war in America had reached its lowest level while his anticipated strategy of helping build Vietnam's fighting forces into a team formidable enough to hold off the insurgency from the North had notably failed. As a result, Nixon sought to convince Americans that the agreement he was able to achieve embodied "Peace With Honor" when Communist troops remained in place in the South, prepared to finish the job and achieve a unified Vietnam. Debate had persisted over the years over whether Nixon and Kissinger were aware of what ultimately would transpire, and that the agreement signed and put into place was nothing other than a facade meant to disguise an ultimate result of which they were well aware. The documents unearthed by Berman demonstrate an awareness of Nixon and Kissinger of the tragic nature of circumstances and the inevitability of a Communist triumph.

William Hare

I try to read books about the Vietnam conflict often. I also try to read about all the different types of 'jobs' that were utilized during this period. This book I found to be less descriptive than I liked and was almost boring. But at least it gave a perspective that is not often heard about. I would still recommend the book due to this.

The book contains the author's (R.D.Spalding's) experiences as an AH-1G Cobra Attack Helicopter Pilot during his one-year tour of duty (1969/70) in Vietnam with the so-called „Centaurs"-outfit (hence the title), D-Trp.3/4 Cav, 25 InfDiv. This is preceded by a not less interesting account of his personal road to become such a Helicopter pilot. The book ends with his return home, almost nothing is told on his „afterlife".

During the course of such a book the reader usually sooner or later starts to „identify" or sympathize with the protagonist/chronicler. Spalding makes it hard to do so, partly because he hardly shares his thoughts and emotions. Also, he doesn't, although a certain pride in himself can be felt, portray himself as a flawless wonder-hero.
Incidents where he caused friendly fire casualties, hunts a majestic buzzard for no apparent reason with his minigun or when he fails to intervene as the only witness when his aircraft commander kills an unarmed civilian(?) for „looking suspicious", getting permission to fire by lying over the radio that he was armed - these and more plainly show that this is not a fiction book, but a real person with whose actions you cannot always completely agree (though who are we to judge...).

The events he chronicles through his tour in Vietnam are quite intriguing, though the book maybe is not as spectacular as comparable or fiction books. This is not meant especially negative; it is the more riveting because it is so realistic and believable, appalingly real.
It is the stunning little, self-contained everyday things he tells, like when his platoon leader cancels the long-granted R&R in Australia due to a personnel shortage, only to be going there himself, or when they find out that the old vietnamese lady that cleans their hootches can repair them a Kalashnikov better than any of them.

The writing is less of a fanciful / overly-poetic style, more matter-of-fact-like, i.e., don't expect great descriptions of the landscape or reflections on the beauty or his emotions etc.
Rather, it is written more like a concise diary; similarly, there is no real plot or literary scheme, Spalding is telling the single events as they come up and quite unconnectedly, although generally in chronological order.

The book is very worthwhile to read. It makes an excellent complement with Robert Mason's „Chickenhawk" and Hugh Mill's „Low Level Hell". Together with these, all three interlocking basic helicopter types working together at that time, UH-1 Slicks /troop carriers, OH-6 Loaches/scouts and AH-1 Cobras/gunships, are covered with a view on the same topic from the three respective perspectives, completing the picture when read interdependently.
If you haven't read any of these yet, I have to honestly admit that „Chickenhawk" or „Low Level Hell" are more colorful (in a metaphorical sense, of course), though also more voluminous. They also have some pictures, which „Centaur Flights" does not.
If, however, you have already read the former two, I most strongly suggest that you read thisone, too.

Dan Spalding has been through the meat grinder of Combat flying in Vietnam and come out the other side with a real cracker of a story.From page one Spalding immerses the reader in the world of military aviation during the most volatile period of modern history. The action and tactical descriptions are brilliant and will satisfy the most ardent of military historians as well as providing an insight into this unique style of Helicopter combat. We roll in with Spalding as he Hoses down AAA with miniguns, launches rocket attacks on bunkers and rescues grunts from the approaching VC, all described in the vivid detail of a veteran who lived the tale. While the action is top notch, personal involvement with the Author is low. There seemed to be a reluctance to share many of those anecdotes and comradely observences most war pilots include in there tales.While this lack of pathos does not detract from the overall story it does leave the reader with a feeling of being an observer rather than a participant.Centaur Flights is no "Chickenhawk", but the book more than holds its own when compared with its contemporaries.Definately reccomended reading for air combat buffs and Vietnam historians. Bravo Centaur 4-4! More please!

While this book was well researched, it reads like agovernment publication... long on facts, short on human interest. There are very few stories from the men who mastered this skill, so don't buy this to read hair raising stories of those that fought for us. Most of the book is the technical history of the art, and thetraining programs set up by various countries. I found it very hard to hold my interst, do not read it in bed uless you want to go to sleep faster. As research it is A+, so I gave it more stars than I normally would have.

Not a very exciting book. Lots of statistics and facts about the formation of sniping units. If that is what you are looking for then this is the book for you.
Ed Kugler's review is right on the money but I enjoyed Ed's book "Dead Center: A Marine Sniper's Two-Year Odyssey in the Vietnam War" much more. I respect both authors for their service to our country.
Thanks Guys!

I found this book to be excellent from an historic standpoint of what is a sniper and what do they do. It is not one that has lots of war stories but it does document what snipers did and how they did it. If youre looking of for a bunch of war stories then this isnt it. If youre looking for details and research behind snipers ... then this is it