My own multiple interests in organizational redesign, learning and adaptation, and national security issues led me to read this book. MAJ Nagl is an armor officer, a Rhodes Scholar, and a former instructor of International Affairs at West Point. His book, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaysia and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, discusses the way armies learn within the frameworks of the British experience with counterinsurgency in Malaya and the American experience in Vietnam. It is particularly timely as the army finds itself in a global war against shadowy networks more reminiscent of insurgencies than conventional armies. These networks have turned the "rules" upside down. Networks that can change direction at will or that can go in different directions simultaneously are not easily defeated by bureaucratic juggernauts that require fifteen years to field a new weapon system or that still apply failed tactics from thirty years ago. Victory in multiple, rapidly changing environments requires the ability to learn and to adapt and may even require differing victory conditions, organizations, and core competencies depending upon the context.

MAJ Nagl presents a twofold thesis. First, the British Army developed a successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Malaya due to its performance as a learning institution. Second, the American Army failed to do the same in Vietnam and in fact actively resisted the necessity of learning to fight a new sort of war. But what is organizational learning? Learning theorists tend to recognize the inherently iterative nature of the learning process whether they characterize it using a simple model such as Boyd's OODA loop or Ackoff's more complex organizational learning and adaptation model. To develop his thesis, the author first looks at Richard Downie's model of the learning cycle as applied to the development of doctrine [1]. This model is more complex than the OODA cycle and less complex than some other models. Overall, Downie's model provides a reasonable framework for this study. MAJ Nagl then evaluates each army's experience using a set of questions to measure the effectiveness of each as a learning institution.

To answer these questions, the author provides a summary history of insurgency itself, a description of the historical context in which each army's organizational culture developed, and the details of the respective British and American experiences in Vietnam. He finally sums up his conclusions in a "lessons learned" chapter that provides recommendations to foster learning within the army.

Largely due to its historical context, the British army developed an organizational culture characterized by a focus on limited war, diverse, global experience, a decentralized organization, and doctrinal flexibility. In contrast, American military history led to an organizational culture focused on absolute victory, large wars characterized by technology and overwhelming firepower, and political and cultural naivete.

After establishing the historical context for these very different organizational cultures, MAJ Nagl described in detail their specific experiences in Malaya and Vietnam. The British army in Malaya went through two distinct phases in evolution as a learning institution. During the first phase, the army was still focused on its most recent experience in conventional war in World War II and Korea despite the presence of a significant number of officers with experience in "small wars". This hindered effective learning in the face of the insurgency. During the second phase, the British army developed fully as a learning organization. The key difference between these two phases was the leadership imposed by General Miles Templer and his recognition that victory meant political victory as well as operational and tactical victory. He fostered a climate of innovation that ran the gamut from free primary schooling for children of all ethnicities (Malay, Indian, and Chinese) to extensive use of intelligence, clandestine operations, and psychological warfare to the steady development of a government capable of taking over after independence. The combination of these innovations enabled the forces fighting the insurgents to truly win the "hearts and minds" of the people of Malaya and to remove the fish (the insurgents) from the water (the people). Coupled with these innovations, and probably one of the keys to their effectiveness, was a limitation on the use of overwhelming firepower and the subordination of the military to the political.

In contrast, the author effectively makes the case that the US Army in Vietnam failed to develop as a learning organization and, in fact, actively resisted the adaptations necessary to develop an effective counterinsurgency doctrine. MAJ Nagl cites ample evidence that the military refused to listen to its own civilian leadership when it called for a more politically-sensitive approach to counterinsurgency, that it rejected internal studies pointing out its own flaws and refused to learn from them, and that it did not foster tactical and operational innovation but, instead, relied upon superior technology and overwhelming firepower even when these could prove counterproductive. The US approach largely lost the "hearts and minds" of the people and lost the war politically and, ultimately, militarily.

The depth of the author's research is evident in every chapter and should satisfy the rigor of academia while, at the same time, the writing style is clear, concise, and leaves little doubt as to the author's reasoning. Overall, MAJ Nagl has made an impressive contribution to the study of organizational learning that will prove valuable to anyone interested in these concepts as well as those for whom there is no substitute for victory. This study is especially relevant today. One must wonder, for example, if the Army, 10 years after Mogadishu, has developed effective doctrine for fighting on urban terrain in the developing world or has merely chosen to avoid that fight and to remain unprepared for an enemy who wisely uses terrain to avoid superior technology and firepower. To be successful in an age of "small" wars, Nagl concludes that the Army "will have to make the ability to learn to deal with messy, uncomfortable situations an integral part" of its organizational culture. It must, per T.E. Lawrence, be comfortable eating soup with a knife.

Highly recommended, there is an excellent chance that this book is the one for which you have been searching. Written by two Australian veterans of the war in Vietnam and standing as a tribute to all who served in that conflict, Crossfire is a unique look at the way in which a specialized Australian infantry platoon operated as a reconnaissance unit in the field. While the style of writing is at once both raw and gritty, it is nonetheless a book with a great deal of soul. It tells the story of how a bunch of blokes at the sharp end, fought (and in some cases, died) in what became Australia's longest and most divisive war. Like so many "Diggers" who went before them, they did their duty and more. They laughed together, felt pain and sometimes cried together, but throughout, maintained that very Australian characteristic in the face of adversity: a stoic determination to see the job done, no matter what.

Crossfire is much more than just another war story, however. It goes beyond the jungle-bashing and the contacts and the firefights; beyond the heat and the sweat and the sometimes gut-wrenching fear that were the essence of the grunt's war in Vietnam. The authors have adopted a mode of presentation that works extremely well and complements the theme of the main narrative. Interwoven with the exploits of the Reconnaissance Platoon as it sought to come to grips with its task in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam, is a separate but complementary story focused on the present. It looks briefly at a small group of veterans, some thirty years after the event, as they seek a kind of cathartic release while camping and hiking in the Flinders Ranges, that area of rugged but serene, natural beauty in "outback" South Australia.

Based on incidents and events that actually occurred, Crossfire not only holds the interest all the way, but in many places reads like a best-selling novel. Indeed, it is one of those rare books, which once started, is entirely difficult to put down. This is a very worthy addition to the genre, and it is a credit to Peter Haran and Robert Kearney that they have captured so faithfully what it was to be in action on the ground in Vietnam. If you are a veteran of the Vietnam War, then in a very real sense the incidents and events portrayed in the book will have an uncanny knack of taking you back there. It will take you back to another time and another place - to a conflict and an era that you have known intimately, and which will forever feature in the history of the Australian soldier at war. If you are not a veteran and you read no other book on the subject, you must read this one. As Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove, Chief of the Australian Army, says in the foreword to Crossfire: "Read this story. Read about these Australians. They are so ordinary but so extraordinary - they are heroes."

As a student at Texas A&M University taking a course in American Military History I cannot recommend any other book higher in the subject of the Air Force's role in Vietnam. From begining to end this book details policies, aircraft, and general deployments of bases in and around Vietnam. Additionally, this book is written on a higher educational level which allows for a more concise and accurate description of what the author is trying to convey. As a general history book I recommend Big Story by Peter Braestrup. However, if you wish to learn more about the Air Force specifically this book goes into greater detail throughout the entire war.

Our nation breathed a collective sigh of relief when The Paris Peace Accord was signed in 1973. It was supposed to be the end of the Vietnam War. As we would learn 2 years later, it was not. Olivier Todd originally covered the war from 1965-1973. After the Fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, he decided it was time to summarize the final days of the conflict. His book covers the infamous 4-month period from January to April in 1975 and the total collapse of South Vietnam. In reading this book, it is quite obvious he invested a great deal of time into interviews and research. The book not only reviews the final days but also raises many questions about the events surrounding them. The reader will find himself mixing memories with those questions in every chapter.

Cultures In Conflict: The Viet Nam War by Robert E. Vadas (Associate Professor, Department of Education, State University of New York, Potsdam) is a scholarly discussion and an informative retrospective of the Vietnam War, especially in terms of its long-lasting policy and cultural repercussions in both America and Vietnam. Highly recommended as being a broad-minded, fair-handed study of the forces shaping the war and the scars left behind in their wake, Cultures In Conflict is enhanced for both scholarship and the non-specialist general reader with appendixes offering the text of Ho Chi Minh's declaration of independence and his letter to President Harry S Truman.

This is the personal story of the author's daughter, Danielle, from Vietnam. It is a colorfully illustrated story, with a happy tone, for younger children. When the Roberts' planned adoption from China fell through, they looked around the world for their little girl. She isn't in Africa, she isn't in Russia, she isn't in Peru. But there are many children waiting in Vietnam. The Roberts adopt two boys from Vietnam and continue to wait. Finally they bring Danielle home. The story ends with a picture of the happy Roberts family, two parents, three birth children and three children adopted from Vietnam, and the celebration of Danielle's adoption.

Young children will enjoy the bright and lively illustrations and simple upbeat text. It would also make a nice gift for waiting families. As they get older, children are likely to have additional questions about their adoption, waiting children and their life in Vietnam, to which parents can use their shared reading time together to answer.

I've read many novels that came out of the Vietnam War. I was one of many little brothers who watched our older brothers go off to it so I have always been trying to understand it from a concerned spectator's point of view. This novel by Ed Dodge has increased my understanding significantly. The title means pain, and it is sometimes painful to read this story. The ending brought me to tears. This is an important book; it deals with post-traumatic stress disorder in a powerful and poignant way. Readers wanting depiction of action in Vietnam will also find no disappointment here. We often think of just the "grunts" when looking into Vietnam, but its scope involved all of our military in their own unique ways. I advise anyone interested in Vietnam to seek this book out. And as I am writing this on Memorial Day, to remember and honor men like Ed Dodge, who gave so much in the service of our country.

Dear Donna It's only 45 Hours from Bien Hoa by Douglas Neralich is the gut-wrenching personal account of his year in Vietnam. An elementary school teacher turned Army medic, Douglas was only twenty-two when called to serve his country as part of the 36th Engineer Battalion, stations at Vinh Long, in Vietnam in 1970. The vignettes presented are both gripping and horrifying, sometimes gentle, sometimes cruel, and taken altogether form an unforgettable picture of the war in this engaging memoir. Enhanced with occasional pencil sketches, Dear Donna It's only 45 Hours from Bien Hoa is a welcome and recommended contribution to Vietnam Military History collections and reading lists.

Highly recommend. Should be required reading for students studying this period in history.

One of the best books I ever read. If you want to to know the truth about Vietnam, this book ist a must. Peter Scholl-Latour was present in Vietnam from the French intervention to the Chinese episode. He writes very cromprehensive and with great knowlegde. Partuculary exciting is that it is a report of his personal experiences, without pretending to be a political or military scientificly valid study. That makes it more accessable to non-political expert readers. Of course, he is a worldwide acknowledged expert.
Particulary for american readers, I think this book from a non-american is important to read. Often, the american vision about the Vietnam war is somehow distorted.
So it is a very exciting and informative lecture.