This book of short stories is an excellent compilation giving a full treatment to various subjects related to war. It looks from different perspectives both during and after the war. In addition to being thought provoking, it is a fun read, and some images will stick in your head for years! Donald Anderson teaches Creative Writing at the Academy (I took his class!) and I look forward to more work from him.

This is an excellent collection of short stories that take on the meaning of the war in a way you've never experienced.

In this brilliantly-researched study, Peter Busch examines the Conservative government's policy towards the US war against Vietnam for the years 1961 to 1963. The author, who formerly worked at the Public Record Office at Kew, has thoroughly mined newly available records from Britain, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Germany. He also shows how British policy towards Vietnam related to wider policy towards South-East Asia, especially towards Indonesia. In both cases, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ruled out negotiated settlements and preferred to use force.

Busch shows how Macmillan fully backed President Kennedy's aggressive military build-up in Vietnam, 'a clear breach' of the Geneva agreements, while advising him to conceal it. Macmillan pretended to be a peacemaker, while actually supporting the US war. He aimed to keep Britain's 'great power' status and prove its value as a US ally.

As co-chairman of the International Control Commission set up by the 1954 Geneva Conference, the British state abused its role in order to support the illegal, dictatorial Diem regime in the south. It backed up Diem's unwarranted claims that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was responsible, 'whether there was evidence or not', for starting the civil war in the south. It used these claims to rule out the DRV's call for reconvening the Conference to negotiate the peaceful reunification of Vietnam.

Macmillan helped the US counter-insurgency effort, setting up the British Advisory Mission in 1961. British forces also trained Diem's troops in Malaysia. In 1962, the British Ambassador to Saigon urged the USA to 'crush and eradicate the Viet Cong'.

The British government only dropped Diem when it discovered that his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was willing to discuss peace with the DRV. It then backed the US coup against Diem that sabotaged the chances of peacefully reunifying Vietnam.

Busch concludes that the British government did not pursue peace. "Britain supported the American policy in Vietnam wholeheartedly. The British only wanted to 'sell' this policy in a different, less confrontational way." Plus ca change! This superb book vindicates all those who opposed the US aggression against Vietnam.

This book is an excellent addition to the literature on the Vietnam war, providing us with a new perspective. It is full of novel information but still easy to read, which is quite an achievement. It is particularly interesting -- given the current political situation -- to learn how eager the British government was to support Kennedy's Vietnam policy. This is a real revelation.
The book's approach is truly international, and the research is more than impressive. Among the archives the author used are the national archive of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US, and of course Britain.

This book really moves. Taylor Eubank flew 200 combat missions in Southeast Asia--all unarmed. He was a member of a small group of American servicemen to go into combat unarmed. This makes for exciting flying and exciting reading. The tales of derring-do and night flights and unarmed photo runs over Hanoi are funny and poignant and, well, gripping. I could not stop reading "The Longest Run," which recounts missiles (SAMs) coming from all around while the mission required the aircraft to fly straight and level. Try putting that down! This is a really good read. If you or yours have been touched by the Vietnam conflict in any way, you need to read this book.

"I have flown into the jaws of the cat of death," is the English translation of a Vietnamese proverb, which applied to flying at night. American aviators simply said, I have seen the Doom Pussy. This story would be good fiction; as it is--true--it is electrifying. That, plus the story of the snake, the guard and spending Monopoly money on the local economy are enough for me to recommend this to anyone. One last pathos: combining Ed Atterberry's plane being shot down with Browning's poen "...Ghent to Aix" works beautifully. Plus we learn how even respected and veteran reporters published false information about the torture or lack of torture of Americans in the Hanoi Hilton...well, I got bleary eyed. Read this. You'll laugh more than you cry, but you'll do both.

Having spent some time with 1st Force Recon near 881S & 881N & Khe Sanh just prior to tet, I will have to say that what I experienced vs. what 3/26 encountered during those for intense days did not compare. The format of the book and the research the author conducted was insurmountable. This book was riveting to me and those that enjoy REAL LIFE encounters. I picked up the book and read it until I finished it in one eight hour period. I picked the book up in east Tennessee at a used book store for (price)I thought I overpaid, but after reading it I can see why it would sell for (price)instead. The author captured direct quotes from the officers and enlisted alike which made it sound like I was right in the middle of the cluster (....)It was an outstanding compilation of the events that occur in a combatzone. If the VA and other parties read this book they would realize themselves how difficult it would be to maintain their sanity in times that were discussed. THIS IS A MUST BUY BOOK. BUY THE BOOK!

This book is very well written and very factual. It tells the story of those few days in the life of 3rd BN 26th Marines just as it happened. For most people that have never experienced combat this will open their eyes. If you had a relative or friend that served in Viet Nam and for sure if they served in the U. S. Marines you should read this account of 3/26. I served in 3/26 from August of 1966 to October of 1967 and was there at Ambush Valley. I was the 81mm mortar forward observer attached to Kilo Company during this time. I sincerly appreciate the work of Eric Hammel in telling our story.

What a great book! It's a pageturner! I read it on the airplane, and it's even more gripping than Grisham and King combined! A must read.

This is THE greatest book in the world! I don't think I've ever seen a more accurate description of what this book covers! More than ANYTHING I want to meet John C. Warren. He must be an AMAZING person to talk to and to know. I think anyone who hasn't read this book just doesn't know what they're missing. I cry for them. But this is a GREAT BOOK! THE GREATEST IN THE WORLD!!! 'Nuff said.

I found this book to be a very interesting accounting of the war in Vietnam through the eyes of airborne advisors and Vietnamese airborne soldiers. Having been there as an advisor to an airborne battalion, the recollections of others reminded me of many events that occurred while performing those duties. I thank Mr. Strode for putting together a book that will preserve some of the history of Americans and Vietnamese.

The best book available in English on the elite of the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces. Though it lacks informatio on the last two years of the war like the hard fought battle of Hill 1062 in the First Corp in 1974. Also lacking was the biography of all Airborne Division battalion commanders. Still it deserve high praise for giving credit long overdue to the heroic ARVN paratroop soldiers. The best fighters in the Viet Nam War.

It had to be done! If Ralph Young, aided by Steve Davis, illustrator and Kevin Lyles, figure artist had not produced volume 1 of a proposed ten volume series about Army Aviaton in Vietnam, many of the details and most of the pictures and maps would have been lost forever. However, Ralph Young did produce volume 1, and it is a success. If volume one is any indication of future publishings in the series, you will not want to miss any that are published. I personally know of no other more complete and documented historical journal. This one is gleened from official and personal information gathered from the actual combatants. We all will someday be indebted to Ralph Young for doing the almost impossible task of telling much of our story; the story we all lived, one year at a time.

The Army Aviation story began as far back as October 1954 with the Avn Div. and Flight Det. of MAAG, Indochina in Saigon. In those early years Army Aviation was very very small and consisted of young men baptised in the combat of WWII and Korea,. However, most were trained as aviators well after WWII. The US Army Air Corps had split to form the US Air Force leaving hardly anyone who possessed flying skills within the US Army. Young men like COL. Kenneth D. Mertel, COL. Samuel G. Conley, CW4 Frank Baldwin, Gen Joe Stillwell and dozens more acknowledged by the author, brought together the men and early aviation assets to set rotors/propellers in motion in SE Asia. These pioneers provided leadership which would advance Army Aviation. They carefully formed Army Aviation's stength, tactics and composition to what we know today.

Army Aviation in Vietnam, 1961-1963 is truly an illustrated history of unit insignia, aircraft camouflage and markings. A detail rich text, derived from personal contacts with those who wrote the history, and a humongous amount of fresh personal pictures and illustrations will give you so much detail to absorb that you will want to read and look at each page over and over again. In fact, I can personally attest to the fact that after looking and reading most of the 125 page book several times, I discovered something new every time! Not many books offer that kind of "meat". The pictures are mostly never before seen personal snapshots. They are definitely not the oft used media prints most massproduced media books offer. The hundreds of pictures were offered from the highly prized personal albums of all the contributing men the author personally interviewed and corresponded with during the research phase. This in itself speaks volumes about the respect the contributors have for the job the author has set out to accomplish. You will truly enjoy all the clear, crisp and accurate illustrations. A great job!

Volume 1 is dedicated to the seven men who were in the first night time crash of an H-21 belonging to the 57th Transporation company(Lt Hel) which spun into the ground on an island in the Mekong River at 2200 hours on 11 January 1963. The crash was only days following the Battle of Ap Bac when Army Aviation lost its "cherry" during a large scale combat assault on known Viet Cong positions. Ralph Young devotes several pages to the Battle of Ap Bac and its "lessons learned" which produced many changes to early helicopter airborne tactics. Many of the changes in tactics remained in effect until the deployment of large caliber anti-aircraft and infrared anti-aircraft rockets demanded further change, almost 5 years later. Future volumes by will deal with those changes in much greater detail. I can not wait!

Finally, to put in perspective the task that looms before Ralph Young and his artist and illustrator(who are not even rated aviators) in telling the story of Army Aviation in Vietnam, think about WWII and the volumes of books, movies and stories told over the last half century. Vietnam, on the other hand, was THREE TIMES longer than WWII from 1961-1973! An almost impossible task lies before the author. It is possible that telling the story of Army Aviation in Vietnam might just take a century.

Keep working Ralph, we look forward to each and every book in the 10 book series. I personally will want each and every volume to put in my personal library and to pass on to my children or local library. After all, as I said, it had to be done.

The largest task of an historical writer (after data acquisition) is to assemble an overwhelming jumble of information into coherent and readable, yet accurate text. Ralph Young has done this with this first-in-a-series glossy hardcover.

During the early years of Vietnam, Army Aviation was in flux. Technology advances in power plant design and structural materials had moved helicopters from "damn, it actually flys" category into the realm of practical airborne utility "trucks" that would eventually be fitted with offensive weaponry.

The Army fixed-wing inventory of this period was growing from single-engine light observation and liason aircraft to more complex single and twin- engine cargo and resupply aircraft, capable of STOL (short take-off and landing) performance on remote, unimproved landing strips.

Ralph Young's book chronicles this era, identifying the aircraft, the units and the men that made it happen. The many excellent photos and descriptions detail the evolution and growth of Army Aviation from piston-engine helicopters with their limited carrying capacity to the early "Huey" models. The ubiquitious Huey, with its distinctive shape and sound became, for many, the symbol of everything that flew in Vietnam, but there were others in those early years--the H-13 from Korea MASH fame, the H-21 Flying Banana, the H-34 and the H-37.

The book also covers fixed wing development, as the L-19 (later known as the TO-1D), the L-20 (U-6A) Beaver and the U1A Otter were joined by the twin-engine CV-2 Caribou, RU-8D (L-23) and the OV-1 Mohawk. The Army's growing fleet of fixed wing cargo and offensive aircraft was viewed with alarm by the Air Force as infringement on its perogatives and would be the subject of intense inter-service debate during the mid-sixties.

Anyone interested in accurate details of Army Aviation aircraft, markings and unit insigna from the period of 1961 to 1963 will enjoy this book. The follow-on book will pick up next period, the mid-sixties, and should continue the outstanding effort of this book.

Dennis Toaspern, Historian, Army Otter Caribou Association

The "Army Aviation in Vietnam" series of books are a welcome and long overdue addition to the library of U.S. military history. As a current Army aviator, I find this series invaluable in allowing me to trace the history of Army aviators and their units.

Rich in detail, Mr. Young's work is unequaled and fills a gap that has existed for quite a while. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the history of Army aviation or the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war.

This is the second of Ralph Young's series of fine books on the insignia and units of the Army Aviation units in Vietnam, both fixed wing and helicopter. I'm proud to own both of the existing books, and will buy each and every one as they are produced. This is a labor of love for Ralph, and it is a privilege to accompany him as he recognizes members of all the helicopter units that were in RVN at different times of the war. He is a walking encyclopedia, and his remarkable books show this. My unit, the 175th OUTLAWS is displayed correctly and prominently, and I am looking forward to the third edition of his series, which will feature my bird, Outlaw 23, representing the fine aviation art his illustrator is capable of. History of the individual units and their personnel who mattered are also included in this excellent work. Put it on your bookshelf!

This book upset me greatly. Not because it was terribly gruesome. Not because I was told of some horrible acts of brutality. It upset me because Mr. Baritz shows how our goverment, and the bureaucracy that supports it, screwed over thousands of young men who died fighting a futile war. Though I was upset after finishing the book, I am glad that I read it. Anyone who grew up after the Vietnam War and wishes to know what the heck happened, Backfire is a necessary read.

A book that explains how and why the U.S lost the Vietnam war. It also gives an insight to the erroneous world view and perception of America's decisionmakers (especially in the executive branch of government),vis-a-vis thir world countries. They consistently hedged their bets on the wrong horses by supporting "right wing" tyranical regimes, often alienating genuine democratic movements,hence enabling the long reigns of the Mobutus,and the Pinochets of this world.Loren Baritz clearly explains how America's messianic approach to foreign policy in Vietnam (and other independence seeking third world countries) literally "back-fired", culminating in the reverberating cries of "yankee go home!" of the 50's and 60's. Certainly a "must read" for every American college student and foreign policy official, if the U.S is to learn anything from the carnage that was the Vietnam war!

NATO's assault on Yugoslavia is remarkably similar to the USA's war of aggression against Vietnam. Loren Baritz's excellent book Backfire: a history of how American culture led us into Vietnam and made us fight the way we did, (Morrow, 1985) presents the US Government's pattern of thought, in some detail. The McGeorge Bundy report of February 1965 "concluded by informing the president that if he kept his focus on what the NLF was doing in the South as the cause of our bombing in the north, the world's criticism of the bombing could be dealt with. If the American players would continually emphasize the atrocities of the guerrillas, 'the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable.' America must not get sucked into negotiations for peace except for what amounted to an unconditional surrender of the guerrillas." "While he (President Johnson) was destroying the country with bombing, defoliation and napalm, he could without cynicism speak of peace and progress. He believed that the destruction was unfortunately necessary before the construction could occur. That was Ho Chi Minh's fault." "During the debate about whether the United States should send its bombers to help the French at Dien Bien Phu, the Chief of Staff of the army, General Matthew B. Ridgway, recalled that in Korea, where he had been in command, 'We had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win a war ... It was incredible to me that we had forgotten that bitter lesson so soon - that we were on the verge of making that same tragic error.' The lesson we had learned in World War II was forgotten before it was relearned in Korea, and was forgotten again in Vietnam. Old myths apparently neither die nor fade away. Before America withdrew from Vietnam, we dropped four times more bombs on Vietnam than all the bombs we dropped all over the world during World War II. It did not work, as the CIA regularly said it would not." "LBJ had received the advice to start the air war to prevent the ground war." But a failed air war provoked pressure for a ground war. "The decision to send in the marines was based on the assumption that they would serve only 'security', not combat, objectives. The war planners did not have to admit to themselves that they were in an Asian ground war. The President did not inform the American public about the decision to send the marines when he had the opportunity to do so. America soon learned what was happening, and Secretary Rusk explained, if that is the right word, that the marines were ordered to avoid combat, only to return enemy fire." Paul Warnke, the appropriately-named Pentagon hack, said, "There is no question of the fact that we can keep on winning the war forever. We always win and we always will, and it won't ever make any difference. Our wins won't make a clear dent because there is no way in which we can bring about political progress in South Vietnam. ... The more of an American occupation you engage in the longer you're going to stay." "Guerrillas do not need to win; they simply must avoid losing. Conventional forces must win. Guerrillas can wait for the expense of foreign expeditionary forces to wear down the enemy's economy, and for the accumulating casualties to enrage the home front. Guerrillas are at home to start with. They never need to fight set battles unless they choose to. Because they can wait, time is on their side and is therefore a test of the enemy's patience and will in a distant land." "General Westmoreland's 'strategy' was to fight a 'war of attrition', to kill as many guerrillas and North Vietnamese troops as possible. Then they would quit. Then we would win. The killing became the objective. General Westmoreland did not know what else to do: 'What alternative was there to a war of attrition?'" But, as a standard military textbook said, "Attrition is not a strategy."

The subtitle of "Backfire" - "A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We did" - sums up the contents well. But it fails to suggest the great evil and ignorance which Baritz's scholarly analysis reveals. Example: G.I.s spent a full year in Vietnam; officers were rotated in and out every six months. Reason: Officers needed to "punch their tickets" (i.e. serve in Vietnam) if they wanted to rise up the ladder of promotion. So military policy was formulated based on that priority, not on the obvious fact that just as officers were becoming really experienced combat leaders, they were sent home and replaced by inexperienced officers. The resulting cost of American lives amounts to a war crime on the part of senior military leaders who put the policy into effect, a war crime against their own men! Another example: U.S. soldiers derided Vietnamese men as "fags" because they saw them holding hands. They were ignorant of Vietnamese culture in which such conduct has nothing to do with sexual preference. Thus, "why fight for a bunch of fags" became a prevalent attitude. Baritz's book is different than almost any other on Vietnam - and more thoughtful and thought-provoking.