I thought this book was a real sleeper. I bought it as a used paperback and based on its title and cover, I expected a "pulpy" style blood and guts novel. Once I looked at it closer, I realized it was a true story. And once I read it, I realized it was an exceptionally well-conceived and well-written book.

The book is in two parts - the first part being about the tour of duty in Vietnam for an infantryman and the second nominally being about "The World". I thought the first part did a fine job of describing the physical and mental hardships imposed on the grunts by the climate, the terrain and the unpredictable boredom/terror nature of the conflict. Following that, Part Two takes the reader through what I believe is the material that really distinguishes this book as one that anyone who studies the Vietnam war should read. Anderson presents a thoughtful and straightforward discussion about the attitudes of Americans who served and those who did not and the forces that shaped those attitudes. He does a great job of relating these to the struggles the servicemen faced in reentering civilian life and to the struggles they faced in dealing with Vietnamese society and their own combat leaders. Placing the veterans' homecoming adjustments, atrocities and fraggings in this context was what moved this book from the very good to the extraordinary class.

Easy to read, hard to put down. Read it - you'll enjoy it and you'll learn some interesting things.

I served with "Andy" in Vietnam in 1969 in the First Battalion Third Marines. He was a friend to everyone and paid very close attention to things around him knowing he would write this book. Many of the stories in the book are based on actual happenings. The pallet of mortar rounds exploding really happened and it was a wonder more Marines weren't killed. This book ranks along with Jim Web's "Fields of Fire" as two of the most realistic Vietnam combat accounts. A friend of mine served under Jim Web and lost his right arm just below the shoulder. He and Mr. Web still stay in touch and continue the bond that can only be formed in combat. Don't waste you money on all those Vietnam war novels until you have read "The Grunts" and "Fields of Fire".

Anderson's book has got to be the next best thing to "being there". I am envious of his talent for "detailing" the ordinary. He is absolutely "right on" in describing just how wonderful plain old ordinary water can taste. I read Anderson's book before I joined the Corps. Since then I've read all the big names in this genre; Sassoon, Graves, Owen, Mailer, Jones, Caputo, O'brien, Webb. I guess I tend to identify more with Caputo's, Webb's, and Anderson's books since they're Marines. It really doesn't matter because they were all good and they all sent a message that has never been heeded. I wish someone would tell a story about us and all the silly c**p that went on in Somalia.

As a person, I find the story depicted here very lifelike and some times scary.....As a fellow L.R.R.P.(69-71),i find it truthfull...sometimes too truthful...brings back old memories best left forgotten. BUT, it is the best way to deal with some of the ghosts still lurking.....

As a fellow writer about life in the military, this is the first time I have enjoyed such colorful yet exacting descriptions. Camper gives the reader all the sights, sounds and smells of this conflict without bitterness or false heroics. After having read Robert Hemphill's "Platoon, Bravo Company", one man's account of the war behind the lines with no color, Dennis Marvicsin's "Maverick" co-written by Jerold Greenfield, a bad mix of WAR and ROSES, this is the best written work by a front liner. Camper's graphic depiction is the story of a young boy who becomes a Vet in a short time. His pictures are exciting without being poetic, thrilling without being melodramatic and personal without being elitist. Unlike Tim O'Brien's "If I Die in a Combat Zone", LRRP chronicles a soldier's life with clarity about his thoughts without the drudgery of the everyday minutiae. And unlike O'Brien, Camper tells a home coming that leaves you wanting to read the next book instead of glad that you finished this one.

A must have for those interested in infantry combat skills. Camper breaks up his accounts into one and two page diary entries that make for quick and easy reading.

This is another fine book by an under-appreciated writer. Mr. Ehrhart, by combining talent with an enormous amount of sheer brute-force legwork, has transformed the individual, often mundane, sagas of his fellow recruit training platoon members into a work of art that is greater than the sum of its parts, much like the Marine Corps itself.

There is a minimalist economy to Mr. Ehrhart's prose, owing, no doubt, to the fact that he is an accomplished poet and therefore acutely sensitive to the value of individual words. This allows, or causes, the reader to think, really think, about any unadorned contradictions present in the lives presented. One man profiled, successful, decent, religious, thinks the United States should have "annihilated" North Vietnam.

The United States should not have been in Vietnam in the first place. Mr. Ehrhart knows this. "Ordinary Lives," without editorializing, allows us to hate the war without hating the warrior brotherhood that is the Marine Corps, and allows us to love the warriors who fought it, our sons and brothers.

I hated finishing Ordinary Lives because I like the book so much. I think Ehrhart has written one of the great books about America in our time, the sort of book Studs Terkel would write if he could. Talk about American Dreams in our time, Lost and Found! Ehrhart's book is also full of mystery. Why did some of the men manage to get their act together and make something of their lives, when others who seemed to have as much or more going for them, ended up suicides? I love the relentless alphabetical format. It emphasizes the arbitrariness of our lives and works well with the military subject. Ehrhart's compassion and respect for the people he interviewed is the great strength and backbone of the book, I think. I had tears in my eyes many times. I also laughed out loud several times. While reading Steven T. Summerscales' entry I thought, there but for fortune go I. How did I end up with such a sweet deal in life, when others, perhaps more deserving, are long since dead? Ehrhart's book handles this mystery in a sensitive yet relentless way. His relentlessness also comes across in his manner of search, but he does know when to let a man go. He strikes a perfect balance between sensitivity and relentlessness in this wonderful engrossing book. David A. Willson Author, REMF Diary

This book has a different slant about the military. It follows up the lives of 80 young men who completed Marine basic training at Parris Island, S.C. Most of the men knew they were headed for Vietnam. As a veteran, I always thought about my fellow recruits and what happened to them. I was sadden by parts of the book. The chaotic nature of some after leaving the Marines, and the death of others. I read many books, rarely military types, as I flinch from violence in my older days, but this type of book had a certain measure of attraction for me. I can't get this book out of my mind, and I don't know why. An interesting concept for a book.

"Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered From All Sides," by Christian G. Appy is a glowing tribute to everyone who fought, aided, suffered or protested the Vietnam War. If anything, the one consistent thread in many of the individual snapshots of the war is that the leaders in Washington underestimated the will of the Vietnamese people. Moreover, the author documents many of the White House & Pentagon decisions that lead to the death of 58,193 American men & women and the loss of 8,588 aircraft.

The Vietnamese accounts of the war are powerful. The hardship of the jungles, the constant hunger, the simple importance of sandals and the dangers of the American air war are all communicated in short vivid passages. Appy also provides ample evidence that the South Vietnamese government was brutal and corrupt and few American officials in the government or military cared to insist on democratic reforms. However, do not mistake the author's intentions...this book is not an apology...it is an honest account of an American tragedy.

Vietnam is the longest war in the history of the United States. Overall the Vietnam war has generated hundreds of books and dozens of movies and documentaries. To this end, put this book up in the ranks of the very best. It is an excellent journalistic report. This book is well-researched and easy to read. The author is able to collect the voices of the high and mighty as well of those of the poor which he skillfully weaves together to create a masterpiece.

Bert Ruiz

This is a truly impressive work from the part of the author who has apparently interviewed more than 350 people from all sides, although only half of the stories have appeared in the book. I have the few following comments:

First, I hope he would make the rest of the stories available to all of us. Second, 'the Vietnam war remembered from all sides' seems to be a misnomer since the proportion of interviewees was slanted in favor of the Americans (71%) and North Vietnamese (22%). South Vietnamese and others shared the remaining 7%. This uneven distribution no doubt would distort the views about the war, unless one would characterize it as an American-North Vietnamese war.

Third, the author has warned us the book is about recollections of the war and as such, 'everyone's memory is partial, selective and faulty.' He has also indicated that since 'Vietnam remains a one-party state that does not allow full freedom of speech,' we should expect North Vietnamese interviewees to tow party line rather than expressing their true beliefs. I am, therefore, not totally surprised when a North Vietnamese talked about the corrupt South Vietnamese regime (1954-1975), but failed to mention anything about the badly corrupt present communist regime.

Fourth, the chapter about the South Vietnamese commando who was dropped into North Vietnam in the 60's and ended up becoming a captive for the next 22 years turned out to be was one of the most interesting stories of the book. He is a true patriot. However, there was no mention about the two million South Vietnamese who left their country following the fall of Saigon and the millions who were interned in reeducation camps throughout South Vietnam.

Fifth, the fact that the ARVN suffered 224,000 deaths and more than one million wounded contradicted the assumption that the U.S. did all the fighting (58,000 deaths) while the South Vietnamese did everything to avoid it. Hanoi had to bear the consequences of sending 1.1 million youths to their deaths. In addition, 2 million civilians (one each from North and South) died during the war. The total casualty was estimated at 3.34 million people (9%) of a combined population of 37 millions (1975). General Giap was appropriate to call it 'the most atrocious conflict in human history,' although he should remember he was one of the instigators of the war.

Despite all these drawbacks, this is by far one of the best books I have ever read about the war. It deals with almost everyone involved in the conflict from grunts to generals, war resisters, civilians, Vietnamese and Americans, and those who, within the U.S. government, argued for and against the war.

I hope the reading of this excellent book would open our eyes to the different points of view that circulated around the world and make us wiser.

Christian Appy goes mining in the oral histories of the Vietnam War and comes up with gems. This is a fascinating collection of stories from people on all sides of this war. Although the book is fairly long, most of the stories are short -- just a couple of pages long on average. Each story can stand alone and be read out of context. But Appy has added much more by carefully organizing the chapters and providing historical context and thoughtful insight. This is an important, thought-provoking book that manages to be thoroughly enjoyable too. Highly recommended to those who are interested in people's stories as part of history in general, and for those who lived through or have ever wondered about the Vietnam War in particular.

Tom writes it as it was. No holds barred. I had many an experience of the supposedly allies(the arvn) running and leaving the Americans to fight alone. To all the helicopter pilots I take my hat off.If it hadn't been for them many more of our young men would have died over there. Roadrunner6 out

One of the battles will forever be a part of me. I was there and flew a huey into Laos many times. This book is most accurate! Black Widow 25

Tom Marshall has written about his experiences as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam with close attention to detail. His thoughts and feelings are very real about his fallen comrades. This book is an awesome tribute to them and their families. As a Vietnam Veteran, he has professionally told his story, and their stories need to be told and read. They are our best resource to the factual history of the VN war. Thank you Tom Marshall.

I first read James Kitfield's book in 2000 and have just finished rereading it. I am recommending it to my sons, an Air Force pilot working on his master's in military science and an Army combat engineer, as one of the four most influential books on the development of the United States military since WW II. The author traces in a very readable style the coming of age of the officers of all branches of service during the Viet Nam and post-Viet Nam eras and how those experiences shaped our ability to win a decisive victory in the 1990 Gulf War. The book also reveals the back room political wheeling and dealing that goes into watershed legislation such as the sweeping reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It's a "must read" for every professional military leader and student of the art of war.

From the prologue to the epilogue, and everything in between, this book is fantastic reading. Anyone who has ever been associated with the U.S. military will have a much clearer picture of the totality of resurection within all the services after Vietnam. "Duty, Honor, and Country" does not always mean the same thing to different people, to some it means a career that spans over thirty years, to others the words are just something on a recruiting poster. To anyone who reads the book these three words will take on a much clearer meaning. Some chapters will cause tears in even the toughest of old veterans, and even the young generation of future service members will begin to understand some of the major events which have transpired in the military in the decades since Vietnam. James Kitfield tells a story that is not just a chronicle, or a documentary, but a story worthy of telling, and he does it with style.

James Kitfield utilizes extensive research and well-toldvignettes to tell a compelling tale; how the economically starved andforgotten military that existed in a post-Vietnam America rose from the ashes to become the professional force that triumphed in Desert Storm. His story is excellent and very readable, and utilizes many small historical steps to reach its logical conclusion to include the end of Vietnam, the military's efforts to combat rampant drug use and undiscipline, the move to an All-Volunteer force, the failure of the 1980 Desert One mission, the advent of realistic training centers, and Graham-Rudman. His tale is told through the eyes of the young lieutenants and ensigns who went on to become the generals and admirals who applied the lessons they painfully learned in the past. A powerful story with a serious warning for military leaders of the present.

I'm four-fifths done with "Honorable Warrior", and about the same amount done with "A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam" by Neil Sheehan, and I'm terribly afraid, in fact, I'm pretty sure (I looked at the ending) that Mr. Sorley will duck the question that his subject could not duck..quite. That question was whether the military effort was going to work. General Johnson was averse to Phoenix-style assassination programs and to unrestrained bombardment. He thought local policing and interdiction of infiltration would answer things. This assumes (on his part) that the South Vietnamese regime would use this breathing space to flourish in democracy, rectitude, and mercy. Why did he assume this? His cherished analytical principle, Mr. Sorley informs us, was "challenge the assertion". For instance, the General tore to shreds, anaylytically, one of McNamara's "Systems Anaylysis" monster-reports on Vietnam by pointing out that it had been cobbled together out of twenty-eight other analyses, each of which had different assumptions. As my history professor would say, "scissors and paste" or "daisy-chaining" does not good history make. My question is whether the General was rigorous enough in evaluating his own thought, his own assertions. The question is directed to Mr. Sorley, who says in his conclusion that the war was actually against mere "surrogates" of China and the Soviet Union. By that logic, we would have been morally authorized to kill every Vietnamese, since they were only inert instruments of the source of the belligerency. Trying to look through Mr. Sorley's somewhat blood-misted eyes, I take seriously his suggestion that the General was often tempted to quit and that he had paralyzing doubts about the war, which he justified to himself as bringing freedom to the people of Vietnam. Did the General end up believing, in the words of the U.S. officer so often quoted, that in order to save the nation of Vietnam it was necessary to destroy it? No, I hear his fans shouting, he was too moral! But was he moral enough to realize that it was immoral to police and interdict a viable political regime (sponsored by Ho) to death in the hope that another regime would spring up from the morally toxic swamps of Saigon? (This concept of viability of regime is the standard upheld by so-called international law in determining which of competing regimes deserves recognition). Could he make that leap of faith in good conscience? Or did he in fact drape his moral doubt in words like "anti-communism" and "security", and leave it to someone else to decide if the whole thing was going to work? My suggestion for a moral lesson is that if you're called on to do something by someone who is farther from the action than you are to the extent that you're confident that you know more about the moral questions raised than your "superior" does, so much so that your sense of obligation to this superior evaporates, you cannot dress up your feeling of emptiness with some slogans, much less with the claim that you're only following orders, but must do something to rectify the malfeasance of your own superiors. In the words of Matthew Ridgeway, words that the Army put on a leadership poster ten years ago, "If you are confident that your orders are mistaken, you are obliged to attempt to fix things." Not his exact words. I don't think he just said to bring it to the attention of your superiors. I suppose that leaves disobedience, resignation, and forceful advocacy. It is the lack of forceful advocacy by the General, and lack of concern by Mr. Sorley over the General's lack of forceful advocacy, that makes the life of the General, as Mr. Sorley tells it, only worth four stars out of five. I mean, you can't just blame everything on General Westmoreland, especially when he worked for General Johnson, traditions of lattitude for field commanders notwithstanding. Alright, how do I know the General wasn't forceful enough since I haven't finished the book? He could have ordered Westmoreland to fix things: whatever, invade Laos, install U.S. commanders in all ARVN units, take over the administration of the South Vietnamese civil population, which is the same as taking over the Saigon regime, whatever it would have taken in his mind to win ("the freedom of the South Vietnamese people", remember) and then suffered the consequences. The President could have fired him. The fact that the President didn't fire him is proof to me that he didn't advocate forcefully enough. That is crude of me. Romantic. Duel at Diablo. End of story. Soul intact. It is so easy in a bureaucracy to adopt the attitude of "garbage in, garbage out", but they pay you and respect you for doing hard things. In the words of the New Testament parable, we are worthless servants when we only do what we are told. If the General had no doubt that his conduct of the war -- he was plumb in the middle of the road of the chain of command, it was on his watch -- was ethical, we cannot second-guess God's judgment of him. To quote the previous reviewer, however, it seems that he thought that his job was to follow orders. That is not ethical. That is, in the final analysis, stupid. We don't creates lines of authority to multiply our stupidity, but to diminish it. If, when you give somebody an order, there is no implicit "or am I being stupid" which they feel free to confirm or deny, you are not getting the best out of that subordinate and the people are not getting its best out of you. This applies the more so, the higher up you go. Hey?

Sorley had become the preeminent biographer of military leaders. His first book, Thunderbolt, was a joy to read. Honorable Warrior is the story of man who fought, the Japanese, survived the Battan Death march and many years of unspeakable horror in Japanese prison camps. He also fought with great bravery in Korea. However, I t was his time as Chief of Staff when General Johnson faced his most difficult professional agonies. Anyone interested in leadership, the military or American history should read this book.

I had the honor to know General Harold K. Johnson while he was a Commanding General, and then to serve two years as his personal aide while he was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Sorley has done a magnificient job of research and reporting on the life of the most dedicated American military leader in recent history. General Johnson was a unique man, humbled by his roots, molded by his experience as a POW, and a man whose personal moral standards never waivered. I think the author has portrayed General Johnson as the man I knew. My only difference with the portrayal is the implication of "resignation in protest" on a number of occasions. General Johnson held the view that his function was to advise the President, and that the President had no obligation to accept that advice. I would accept the "resignation" theory only if it portrayed General Johnson as considering resignation because he felt his advice was inadequate or that his articulation ! of that advice was inadequate. The idea of resignation would have been because he felt someone else could perhaps do it better. He was such a private man that I also doubt he would have shared that thought with others, particularly junior to him. But, a really excellent biography and Sorley has done himself proud.

Halberstam's work is a classic, outlining the dilemma that Vietnam posed to American policymakers in the early 1960s, and written in lucid, newspaper-reporting style. The author's perceptiveness is particularly striking when one considers that he wasn't even 30 years old when he covered Vietnam.

Unfortunately, this McGraw-Hill edition abridges Halberstam's masterpiece. Most of the essential pieces of the story remain, but much of the rich, colorful narrative, which makes this such a fascinating book, is lost. Hopefully, a complete version will return to print soon.

Before reading this book, my knowledge of the Vietnam war was limited to the movies I had seen on the subject, until recently when a friend recommended this book to me after a brief discussion of the war, its political agenda and its intrigue. Making of a quagmire is an extensive and thourough account of the events in 1961 and 1962 that lead to the eventual full american involvemnt in Vietnam. Halberstam provides an unbeleivable and at times jaw-dropping first hand account of the political and military events of the period, and translates with remarkable skill the frustration of the vicious circle that was the american policy in Vietnam. A must read for any one with even a slight interest in the subject

If one wants to understand the debacle or "quagmire" know as the Vietnam War, look no further than this riveting account! In "The Making of a Quagmire," David Halberstam pin points all of the failures of the system years before the first official U.S. troops splash ashore at Danang, Vietnam. His account, a collection of observations about Vietnam under the Diem presidency, is refreshing while at the same time shocking in its findings. While many observers insisted that efforts in Vietnam were progressing so well from 1961-63, Halberstam sees the light. His expose of all the failings of the system includes candid words about the inept south Vietnamese leadership and the American advisors who grow increasingly frustrated with their mission. Most importantly though, Halberstam offers a glimpse into the life of a journalist caught in his own war of censorship.

Denis Foley is a professional writer these days, and it shows in the vivid mental images his writing evokes, the clarity and depth of detail he pours out onto the page, and smell of jungle mold and mildew that seems to rise from the pages of this book. Although this is a work of fiction, much of it aligns with his own life history as written in "Special Men."

Foley's works are not for those who want The Formula Viet Nam book (I fired my belt-fed Stoner from the hip, killed a battalion of suicide VC, then went and had some beer). He includes not just spectacular battle stories, but also some detail on the processes and procedures of inserting a LRP team, calling in air and artillery support, getting a medevac, and the planning and logistics that go into the whole operation. It isn't just "fly out, kill the bad guys, fly back, have some more beer."

Foley's battle sequences are particularly striking in their analysis of what a platoon leader must understand and decide with no time, little information, and a lot of people trying to kill him, and worse, his men.

His contrast between the mission-focused jungle-fighter Maj. Sangean, and the REMF staff-rat Maj. Fowler may seem too stark, too bald-faced, but my understanding is that the truth was sometimes worse. Always too many Fowlers, and not enough Sangeans, in the military or the civilian world. Wonks over workers, but that can be remedied, as Capt. Hollister shows in a severe showdown with the insufferable Maj. Fowler.

This is not just a fictional documentary of events, but the story behind what makes them happen. And his story of the shoeshine boy rings true - I bet he did get two boots shined!

As I said in my review of Take Back The Night. I wish I had, had this one to read first. Again I say Dennis make the words in his books sing. I really enjoyed this book. Having been a member A LRRP/RANGER unit 68 - 69 I feel that this is an authentic story of how things were in these units. Cpt Hollister I feel was an insperation to his men. I thought That Dennis had an outstanding way of telling this story. No BS just as it happened. Roadrunner6 Out

I have read a few of this authors books, largely because I found "Night Work" to be an exceptionally well written Vietnam Novel. The pace of the book is quick, accenting battles and other important incidents. If you like war stories, specifically "grunts", this book should be on your TO READ list!

I came across this book back in 1989 when a friend asked me if my father was Sgt. Eugene Pennington who served in Vietnam. It turned out that he was reading this book and came across my father's name mentioned in it. I had been hearing my father talk of his experiences in Vietnam over the years and was amazed to find a book that so accurately informed the reader of the Vietnam experience. By reading this book, I became quite familiar with the tactics that my father had been trying to relate to me. I bought a copy of the book and gave it to him for Father's Day. To this day I still believe that it was the best gift I ever gave him. I would greatly recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn more about helicopter warfare in the Vietnam era.

If you want to know where America's Air Assault tactics came from, how they developed in Vietnam and by implication how Army Aviation is in trouble today--begin with this book! Have your highlight pen ready when you examine the decisions and actions of the brave pioneers who created 3-D Air Assault capabilities in our Army at the behest of Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara (he could do good things once in a while!). If you read carefully you will see that to get the drastic Army structural changes needed, the capabilities of helicopters were oversold--to get large numbers of helicopters, the ground vehicle was dismissed as a tool with the helicopter doing EVERYTHING. General Kinnard and his wizards of the 11th Airborne Division [later reflagged the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)] went about having helicopters do everything---place troops around the battlefield, act as CAS gunships, fly-in artillery for fire bases--except stay in the "death ground" of enemy fire (re: Colonel Bolger's book: "Death Ground: America's Infantry in battle") as an armored shield and protected transportation means carrying superior levels of firepower. So while Air Assault operations could "run circles" around the enemy on the map board, once Sky Troopers left their mounts, they were vulnerable to enemy fire fighting the enemy "even" at best---as the more numerous enemy could absorb untold casualties without ill effect at home. Its interesting that the helicopter-replacing-everything hubris negated the understanding of the need to field a helicopter-transportable light Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) that could "Air-Mech" with Sky Troopers into battle and give them dominance from that point on in the operation. The M551 Sheridan light tank was available though 7 tons too heavy for the CH-47 Chinook; (I have seen photos of it lifted by the CH-54 Sky Crane heavy lift helicopter) why it wasn't airdropped from fixed-wing C-130 Hercules aircraft and used for 3-D maneuver fire support by the one parachute-qualified Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division is a mystery--the French Airborne parachuted all over the countryside in the first Indo-China war. Perhaps it was the urgency of getting a force that could maneuver deep into the Central Highlands of Vietnam before the enemy cut the South into two over-rode deeper analysis and force-on-force war games to reveal structural flaws and correct them. America was at war.

As you read this superb book which should be a companion to LTG Hal Moore/Joe Galloway's "We were Soldiers once and young" account of the Ia Drang battle fought by the 1st Cav, you get a sense that we miscalculated and were thinking "big blue arrows"--operationally impressed by helicopter distance/speed 3-D maneuver capability and overly reliant on distant artillery howitzer/aircraft supporting arms and overlooked the up close "belt buckle" fight that the enemy chose to fight whenever possible because it would curtail our long-range fires since he had the advantage in RPG explosives weapons effects (ready-to-fire, doesn't need to be unfolded like a M72 LAW) while we fought him "even"; our M16s versus his AKMs, our grenades versus his grenades, our bayonets versus his bayonets, our casualties versus his numbers.

Today, the "pendulum" has swung the other way with the helicopter Air Assault delivering foot-mobile troops implies casualty risks and some Commanders are willing to surrender 3-Dimensional maneuver to the enemy and fight "heavy" only along the 2-D axis, once again over-relying on distant supporting arms fires to defeat the enemy (but its digitized and "precision" this time!) though this means you will be channelized and ambushed in ground vehicle restricted terrain. That aircraft (Aviation branch) could work TOGETHER with tracked AFVs (Armor branch) to position the latter into "go" terrain to overcome the enemy was possible then and certainly do-able today with lighter AFVs like the 3-4 ton German Airborne Wiesel which can be lifted even by the Huey's replacement, the UH-60L Blackhawk.

The solution is to read this book and put yourself in the shoes of the decision makers like a good war simulation, draw on your history and combine Airborne and Air Assault capabilities using that magnificent air-droppable M113 that was rumbling all over the countryside (Coleman mentions go/no-go for tracked vehicle terrain considerations in his book), the new M551 Sheridan light tank, and combine the best attrributes of 3-D and 2-D maneuver into one. The lesson today is to field the M8 Armored Gun System successor to the M551 and modernize the latest M113A3, buy some Wiesels for recon and create an Air-Mech 3-D capability in the U.S. Army today before we fight in another place like Vietnam again. We cannot hope to chose where/when we can fight ("We don't do mountains and we don't do jungles"), living for a replay of the open desert to stampede our heavy armored caccoons ala' Desert Storm---we must be ready to go where America sends us. When South Vietnam was in danger of being severed by the NVA in 1965-66 we sent the best we had: the 1st Air Cavalry Division and they saved the day, though at a cost so high we could not sustain the support at home for the noble endeavor. At least Kinnard's men had some time to run tests and conduct experiments, we may not be so lucky. NOW is the time to get ready, this book would be a good place to start.

Coleman chronicles the history of the Ia Drang campaign from the viewpoints of many levels of the combatants - from brigade, battalion and company commanders to platoon and squad NCO's and skytroopers. Also insights from captured NVA documents and maps on their battle plans. I found his chapters covering the LZ XRay and LZ Albany actions gripping text.